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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND
THE DOMINO EFFECT
LAURA T. KESSLER*
ABSTRACT
Employment discrimination is a multidimensional problem. In many instances, some
combination of employer bias, the organization of work, and employees’ responses to these
conditions, leads to worker inequality. Title VII does not sufficiently account for these
dynamics in two significant respects. First, Title VII’s major proof structures divide
employment discrimination into discrete categories, for example, disparate treatment,
disparate impact, and sexual harassment. This compartmentalization does not account for
the fact that protected employees often concurrently experience more than one form of
discriminatory exclusion. The various types of exclusion often add up to significant
inequalities, even though seemingly insignificant when considered in isolation. Second, Title
VII’s major theories of liability are premised on the assumption that employee
characteristics, such as motivation and work performance, are independent of
discrimination. Yet common sense and a significant body of social science research suggest
that discrimination has significant effects on employees’ work-related decisions and
behaviors, such as the decision to apply for a job or promotion, as well as worker motivation
and job performance. Applying the insights of sociology and social psychology, this Article
examines the fundamental flaws of these assumptions that lie at the heart of Title VII. Race,
sex, and other forms of group-based worker inequality result from a dynamic interaction
among biased evaluations and decisions, structural features of the workplace, and
employees’ responses to these forms of discrimination. I label these workplace dynamics the
“domino effect.” Like an elaborately arranged set of falling dominoes, worker inequality
often results from a series of discriminatory conditions or triggers that combine and interact
in ways that, over time, may lead to large differences in employee status and pay due to
their cumulative and mutually reinforcing nature. I propose and evaluate a set of legal
interventions that would help courts and policymakers better address the domino-like
dynamics that result in inequality for workers protected by Title VII.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Who is responsible for gender, race, and other stubborn patterns
of worker inequality?1 This question lies at the heart of all of the
theories of liability under Title VII.2 From disparate treatment to
sexual harassment, from affirmative action to disparate impact, the
ultimate question is whether worker inequality is due to some
unlawful action by employers, for which employers must be held
accountable, or due to factors outside employers’ responsibility or
control. When an employer calls Greg Baker for a job interview
rather than Lakisha Jones, is it because Greg’s resume suggests he is
1. By “inequality,” I refer to institutionalized rather than individual inequality. All
workers are inevitably “unequal” relative to their peers as a function of their qualifications,
skills, seniority, or even chance events or opportunities. However, I use worker inequality
here and throughout this Article to mean structured inequality between categories of
workers on the basis of their identities such as race, sex, sexuality, national origin, religion, and disability that are systematically created, reproduced, and legitimated by sets of
ideas. See CHARLES E. HURST, SOCIAL INEQUALITY: FORMS, CAUSES, AND CONSEQUENCES 3
(8th ed. 2012) (adopting a similar definition of inequality).
2. This Article concerns itself primarily with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012), which prohibits discrimination in employment on
the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, and religion. Although not an exclusive remedy
for workplace-discrimination, Title VII is the broadest-ranging federal employment nondiscrimination law. For the most part, this Article’s analysis should also apply to other federal
nondiscrimination laws, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act “regarded” as provision, see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C), as well as state employment nondiscrimination laws.
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better qualified or because Lakisha’s name is African-Americansounding?3 When a casino fires a female bartender after twenty years
of service for refusing to wear make-up in compliance with its new
grooming policy, is her termination illegal sex discrimination or a
legally permissible decision based on male customer preference to
have their drinks served by feminine women with sex appeal?4
Similarly, if a retailer of teen apparel decides to brand its “Authentic
American Clothing”5 around the concept of racial and other types of
exclusion, is it responsible when it routinely steers Hispanics,
Asians, and African Americans to stockroom jobs,6 or is this a
legitimate profit-related practice?7 When an ambitious female junior
3. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94
AM. ECON. REV. 991, 991-93 (2004) (studying race in the labor market and finding that
identical resumes with white-sounding names receive fifty percent more callbacks for interviews than resumes with black-sounding names and that the racial gap is uniform
across occupation, industry, and employer size); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L.
Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being “Regarded as” Black, and Why Title VII Should
Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1284 (discussing
discrimination on the basis of having an African-American-sounding name).
4. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2006)
(en banc). Anne McGinley has written extensively about dress codes that sexualize women.
See, e.g., Anne C. McGinley, Babes and Beefcake: Exclusive Hiring Arrangements and Sexy
Dress Codes, 14 DUKE J. GENDER, L. & POL’Y 257, 259-60 (2007).
5. See ABERCROMBIE & FITCH, https://www.abercrombie.com/shop/us (last visited
June 5, 2017).
6. See Steven Greenhouse, Clothing Chain Accused of Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES,
June 17, 2003, at A1. Abercrombie & Fitch ultimately settled a class-action lawsuit based
on these facts for $40 million in 2004 and agreed to alter its image by adding more blacks,
Hispanics, and Asians to its marketing materials. See Steven Greenhouse, Abercrombie &
Fitch Bias Case Is Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2004, at A4. However, the company ran
into trouble again in 2008 when it refused to hire Samantha Elauf, a seventeen-year-old
Muslim woman, because she wore a headscarf, which violated the clothing retailer’s “Look
Policy.” See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015). The
EEOC sued on her behalf, and the Supreme Court ultimately decided 8-1 in the plaintiff’s
favor. Id. at 2034.
7. Abercrombie & Fitch explicitly built its reputation around the concept of discrimination and exclusion. As its CEO Mike Jeffries explained in a 2006 Salon interview:
In every school there are the cool and popular kids, and then there are the notso-cool kids . . . . Candidly, we go after the cool kids. We go after the attractive
all-American kid with a great attitude and a lot of friends. A lot of people don’t
belong [in our clothes], and they can’t belong. Are we exclusionary? Absolutely.
Those companies that are in trouble are trying to target everybody: young, old,
fat, skinny.
See Benoit Denizet-Lewis, The Man Behind Abercrombie & Fitch, SALON (Jan. 24, 2006, 10:16
AM) (alteration in original), http://www.salon.com/2006/01/24/jeffries/ [http://perma.cc/85S9XJUR]. Its stores sold t-shirts with sexist and racist messages such as “Who Needs a Brain
When You Have These?” and “Do I Make You Look Fat?” (women’s shirts) and “Wong Brothers
Laundry Service — Two Wongs Can Make It White.” Id. When asked about the controversial
shirts, Jeffries responded, “I really don’t care what anyone other than our target customer
thinks.” Id. The company refused to carry larger women’s sizes. See Ashley Lutz,
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investing partner in a Silicon Valley venture capital firm is not
promoted, despite her investment successes, is it because she is a
woman or because she is perceived as being ungrateful and difficult,
and being a likeable “team player” is more important at the firm?8 At
Wal-Mart, the most profitable retailer in the United States and the
largest private employer in the world, women make up only thirtythree percent of management employees despite filling seventy
percent of the retailer’s national sales workforce.9 Women are also
paid less than men in every region.10 Is this because gender bias
suffuses Wal-Mart’s culture? Or can these patterns be explained by a
lack of women who are qualified and interested in management
positions at Wal-Mart11 and “left to their own devices most managers
in any corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation that
forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performancebased criteria.”12 If an upscale restaurant has a reputation for not
hiring female food servers, and this reputation discourages qualified
women from applying for server positions, is this employment
discrimination or the result of the women’s personal choices?13 If a
fire department uses a weightlifting test as its primary physical
selection procedure, is the lack of women firefighters due to the fire
department’s hiring criteria or because the average man is stronger
than the average woman?14 What if agility, balance, endurance,
Abercrombie & Fitch Refuses to Make Clothes for Large Women (May 23, 2013,
10:36 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/abercrombie-wants-thin-customers-2013-5
[https://perma.cc/N9Q7-UR87]. It also reportedly incinerated faulty clothing rather than donate it to charity and derided poor people. See Ella Alexander, Would You Rather Go Naked
Than Wear Abercrombie?, VOGUE (May 16, 2013), http://www.vogue.co.uk/article/abercrombiefitch-homeless-campaign-launched-by-greg-karber [https://perma.cc/CW6R-PVXR] (“Abercrombie & Fitch doesn’t want to create the image that just anybody, poor people, can wear their
clothing . . . . Only people of a certain stature are able to purchase and wear the company
name.”). Successful lawsuits, public outcry, and the resulting market tumble eventually led to a
total makeover of the company’s brand. See Elizabeth Holmes, Abercrombie & Fitch Tries on a
New Attitude: Friendly, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/abercrombiefitch-tries-on-a-new-attitude-friendly-1476291100 (discussing the company’s 2013 anti-bullying
campaign and quoting a top executive as stating “[w]e are a positive, inclusive brand, with a nice
sensibility, very different from what they encountered in the past”).
8. See Brief for Respondent at 3, Pao v. Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers LLC, (No.
CGC-12-520719), 2012 WL 6929868, at *3-4; see also Terry Collins, Ellen Pao Trial Ends
on Plea for Gender Equality in the Tech Industry, CNET (Mar. 25, 2015, 4:25 PM),
http://www.cnet.com/news/ellen-pao-trial-ends-on-plea-for-gender-equality-in-the-techindustry/ [https://perma.cc/PJM4-W3S8].
9. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 370 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 356 (Scalia, J., majority opinion); see also EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
839 F.2d 302, 330 (7th Cir. 1988) (adopting a similar “lack of interest” theory of women’s
systemic inequality).
12. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 355.
13. See EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1268 (11th Cir. 2000).
14. See Delia Roberts et al., Current Considerations Related to Physiological Differences Between the Sexes and Physical Employment Standards, 41 APPL. PHYSIOL. NUTR.
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aerobic capacity, speed, and teamwork are as important to successful
firefighter performance as upper-body strength?15 Should Title VII
make a fire department liable for sex discrimination if it emphasizes
upper-body strength over these other important qualities in its
selection criteria? If a female postal service driver becomes pregnant
and her doctor advises her not to lift more than twenty pounds, her
employer forces her on unpaid leave, and she loses her medical
insurance, is this sex discrimination or simply the employee’s
unfortunate problem, since she temporarily cannot meet the job’s
requirements?16 If an African-American dining services employee at a
university is the subject of ongoing racial harassment by a white
coworker, is the university vicariously liable for the harassment?17
Or, rather, is this behavior an unauthorized act of the white
employee for which the university is presumptively not responsible
unless the victim complains and the university negligently fails to
respond?18 What if, fearing for her job, the victim does not complain
at all,19 or she complains, but to the wrong person (for example, to a
mid-level supervisor or a union representative who does not have the
authority to discipline or fire the harasser)? Should this create
liability or is the matter, again, not the employer’s responsibility?20
METAB. S108, S110 (2016) (“Women have approximately 70%-75% of the lower body
strength and 40%–60% of the upper body strength than that of men . . . .”).
15. See Ruth Colker, Rank-Order Physical Abilities Selection Devices for Traditionally
Male Occupations as Gender-Based Employment Discrimination, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
761, 793-97 (1986).
16. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1344 (2015); see also Consent Decree, United States v. Davie, No. 15-cv-60395 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/file/344841/download [https://perma.cc/K7DX-GYQ3] (resolving
allegations of pregnancy discrimination arising from denial of light duty to a pregnant
firefighter despite her medical and physical needs while routinely granting other nonpregnant firefighters’ requests for light duty for non-work-related injuries).
17. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 423 (2013).
18. In these circumstances, the university is not vicariously liable, according to a majority of the Supreme Court, because the white coworker did not have power to take tangible employment action against the African-American plaintiff, that is, to hire or fire her.
Id. For criticisms of the majority’s narrow, formalistic definition of vicarious liability, see
Martha Chamallas, Two Very Different Stories: Vicarious Liability Under Tort and Title
VII Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315 (2014); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights
Without Remedies: Vicarious Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983 and Title IX, 7 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 755, 772 (1999); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 89 (1995).
19. See, e.g., McKinnish v. Brennan, 630 F. App’x 177, 184 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding
that an employer was not liable for sexual harassment, because the plaintiff did not report
her supervisor’s explicit texts and her subjective fear of retaliation did not excuse her failure to report).
20. See, e.g., Chaloult v. Interstate Brands Corp., 540 F.3d 64, 75-76 (1st Cir. 2008)
(holding that the plaintiff must lose her harassment claim even though a supervisor knew
about the harassment, because she should have reported it to a higher-level supervisor).
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Each of these examples is drawn from a recent, real-world
employment discrimination case. As they demonstrate, every
instance of alleged employment discrimination can be conceptualized
as a choice between an illegal “inside” cause of worker inequality and
a legal “outside” cause of worker inequality. Economists and other
social scientists describe this divide in terms of “demand side” and
“supply side” explanations of worker inequality.21 Broadly, demand
side explanations of worker inequality focus on discrimination
occurring inside workplaces such as intentional discrimination,
unconscious biases, and neutral policies and practices that
systematically disadvantage workers protected by employment
discrimination statutes.22 Supply side theories, in contrast, attribute
inequality to workers’ personal preferences, qualifications, and
performance.23 Supply side factors include, for example, the absence
of requisite job skills; differences in education, training, or
motivation; culture and socialization; and choices that employees
make in light of family obligations and other personal circumstances.
The major theories of employer liability under Title VII sharply
differentiate between demand side and supply side causes of worker
inequality. For example, Title VII disparate treatment claims are
premised on the assumption that an adverse employment action is
either because of an employer’s illegal consideration of protected
characteristics (such as race, sex, or national origin) or for a
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.”24 Within this analytical
framework, there is no room to consider if discrimination may have
negatively impacted the “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” basis for an
employer’s decision, such as an employee’s job performance.25 That is,
by its very definition, the legal concept of disparate treatment ignores
the social structure in which prejudice, bias, and discrimination
operate.
21. See Barbara Reskin, Sex Segregation in the Workplace, 19 ANN. REV. SOC. 241, 248
(1993) (discussing the distinction between supply side and demand side drivers of worker
inequality).
22. See, e.g., id. (sex segregation).
23. See, e.g., NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING 30-39, 178-79,
219 (1978) (gender socialization); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 269-73 (1992) (sex roles and human capital);
DAN SUBOTNIK, TOXIC DIVERSITY: RACE, GENDER, AND LAW TALK IN AMERICA 146-64 (2005)
(women’s role as family caregivers, lack of mobility, and relational, non-competitive
nature); Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor, 3 J.
LAB. ECON. S33, S55 (1985) (human capital); Daniel Bell, On Meritocracy and Equality, 29
PUB. INT. 29, 37 (1972) (individual talent and achievement).
24. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
25. Indeed, although the burden is light, showing “satisfactory job performance” is
commonly incorporated as an element in the prima facie case for plaintiffs alleging disparate treatment in cases involving demotion, promotion, or termination. See, e.g., Webb v.
Level 3 Commc’ns, LLC, 167 F. App’x 725, 728 (10th Cir. 2006).
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To be sure, some aspects of Title VII doctrine acknowledge that
demand side and supply side explanations for worker inequality overlap and are difficult to neatly separate from one another. For example, the mixed-motive proof structure suggests that both demand side
factors (i.e., discriminatory considerations of protected characteristics) and supply side factors (i.e., legal considerations of employee
qualifications or performance) may concurrently play a role in an
employment decision, with the ultimate inquiry focusing on which
factor predominated the decision.26 Similarly, Title VII’s disparate
impact theory of liability recognizes that facially neutral employer
policies or practices may so systematically and unjustifiably stack the
deck against protected employees that liability for discrimination
should attach. As such, the disparate impact theory recognizes that
structural aspects of the workplace negatively affect individual workers.27 And the hostile work environment theory of liability defines unlawful discrimination to include a work environment severely and pervasively infected with discriminatory, offensive conduct, such as
threats, intimidation, and ridicule, even in the absence of any formal
personnel action, because of the exclusionary effects of such treatment.
It is easy to point to these examples and conclude that Title VII is
at least reasonably sensitive to the interplay between demand side
and supply side drivers of worker inequality. However, a close study
of Title VII doctrine reveals a decidedly less positive picture. Courts
routinely assume a sharp distinction between demand side and supply side explanations of worker inequality when analyzing and applying Title VII. For example, although the mixed-motive theory recognizes that both legal and illegal considerations may factor into an
employment decision, the mixed-motive theory still assumes the absence of any causal relationship between the legal considerations
(e.g., employee motivation, performance, qualifications) and illegal
considerations (e.g., bias on the basis of protected characteristics).28
When considering systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact claims, courts often attribute stark racial and gender disparities
in pay and workforce composition to external causes, such as the absence of diversity in the applicant pool,29 with little regard for the
powerful role of employers in influencing the labor markets in which
26. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2012); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1989); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93-94 (2003).
27. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 642, 652-62 (2001) (providing a classic account of how Title VII, particularly disparate
impact liability, works as an accommodation mandate when it invalidates facially neutral
rules that disproportionately burden particular groups of employees).
28. See infra Section III.B.1.
29. See infra Section III.B.2.
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they operate.30 Finally, the Supreme Court has carved out a broad
affirmative defense to employer liability for sexual harassment that,
in practical effect, requires victims of harassment to report in virtually all circumstances or risk losing their claims.31 This doctrine neglects the power dynamics and economic vulnerabilities that lead victims not to report harassment.32 By defining discrimination and employee behavior as mutually exclusive phenomena, sexual harassment law, like Title VII’s other theories of liability, ignores the social
patterns of discrimination that shape the employees subject to them.
Mirroring the bifurcated approach in Title VII doctrine, much social science research and public discourse on employment discrimination defines and constructs the issue as a question of whether demand side or supply side phenomena are responsible for race, gender,
and other identity-based patterns of worker inequality, with little
attention to the causal interrelationships between demand side and
supply side factors. Consider, for example, the recent public debate
between Facebook CEO Sheryl Sandberg and former Princeton Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter about why women cannot rise to the top
professionally. In her book, Lean In,33 Sandberg emphasizes the ways
that women lower expectations for themselves in the workplace; she
30. Moreover, class-action disparate treatment and disparate impact cases represent
only a small portion of the employment discrimination cases filed in any event. See Kevin
M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal
Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 112 (2009); John J. Donohue &
Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 983, 998 (1991).
31. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 430-31 (2013). Vance held that an
employer can be vicariously liable for an employee’s unlawful harassment only when the
employer has empowered that employee to effect a “significant change in employment status of the victim, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Id. The
practical result is that employees can now only win a harassment case involving all but the
most senior managers by proving negligence. Id. at 2452, 2448-52. This typically requires
the victim to make a formal complaint, ideally immediately; provide all details; agree to
cooperate in any investigation; and refrain from asking that the harasser not be disciplined. See L. Camille Hébert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain About Sexual
Harassment? 82 IND. L.J. 711, 733 (2007).
32. See Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of
Social Science Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 312-25 (2001) (discussing studies on the reasons that the vast
majority of harassment victims do not report, including fears that they will lose their jobs,
that they will not be believed, and that it will not help their situations); Hébert, supra note
31, at 724-42 (identifying discomfort and embarrassment; fear of being labeled as a troublemaker; not being believed; threats of termination; fear of retaliation; and concerns about
physical safety, among other reasons, for not reporting sexual harassment); Tanya Katerí
Hernández, A Critical Race Feminism Empirical Research Project: Sexual Harassment &
the Internal Complaints Black Box, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1244-45 (2006) (discussing
both that harassers disproportionately target women of color because of their heightened
vulnerability in the workforce and that women of color are less likely to report sexual harassment than are white women).
33. See SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD (2013).
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urges women to strive for leadership roles despite discriminatory
challenges. Her analysis emphasizes individual women’s responsibility for overcoming discrimination.34 In contrast, Anne-Marie Slaughter’s Atlantic Monthly article35 and subsequent book on balancing
work and family36 focus on governmental policies and structural features of workplaces that result in inequality for family caregivers
(still primarily women in our society).37 Although the differences in
Sandberg’s and Slaughter’s positions are perhaps more a matter of
emphasis or degree, which in turn influences what each commentator
sees as the appropriate remedy for gender-based economic inequality,38 the media has held up these two prominent influential women as
opposing voices.39 There is a similar “either/or” framing in research
and public discourse on the gender pay gap, with proponents of wage
equity attributing the wage gap to discrimination and wage-gap deniers emphasizing supply side human capital factors, such as education, experience, and individual worker “choices.”40
As these examples demonstrate, Title VII’s major legal doctrines,
as well as public debates about employment discrimination, regard
the three prevailing explanations of worker inequality—individual
employee choices and characteristics, biased decisionmaking, and
structural features of the workplace—as distinct and independent
phenomena. The result is that our country’s most important federal
employment discrimination law is oftentimes unable to redress employment discrimination as it actually manifests inside workplaces.
Further, by failing to recognize the dynamic, interactive processes
generating worker inequality, legal and political discourses on discrimination mask the pervasive and powerful role of institutions in
creating inequality.

34. Id. at 142-58.
35. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Still Can’t Have It All, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, July/Aug. 2012.
36. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: WOMEN MEN WORK FAMILY
(2015).
37. Id. at 119-25.
38. For Sandberg, the solution is women’s ambition, confidence, and working harder;
for Slaughter, it is changing the way that companies and government benefits work. Compare SANDBERG, supra note 33, at 160-72, with SLAUGHTER, supra note 36, at 207-08.
39. See, e.g., Jodi Kantor, A Titan’s How-To on Breaking the Glass Ceiling, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/22/us/sheryl-sandberg-lean-in-authorhopes-to-spur-movement.html; Patricia Sellers, Slaughter v. Sandberg: Can Women Have
It All?, FORTUNE (June 25, 2012), http://fortune.com/2012/06/25/slaughter-vs-sandberg-canwomen-have-it-all/ [https://perma.cc/MB79-SX3W].
40. See Rachel Greszler & James Sherk, Equal Pay for Equal Work: Examining the
Gender Gap, HERITAGE FOUND. (May 22, 2014), https://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/
2014/pdf/IB4227.pdf (“Aggregate differences in pay reflect different choices made by individual men and women.”).
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Many legal scholars have addressed the stubborn nature of discrimination and the often complex and nuanced ways that it manifests in the workplace. For example, many have discussed the unintentional and unconscious nature of much discrimination, emphasizing the mismatch between this reality and disparate treatment law.41
Others have examined the organizational context of work as a driver
of inequality, focusing, for example, on how organizational practices,
such as decentralized, subjective decisionmaking, the creation of nondiverse work groups, and other features of organizational design and
culture may influence the occurrence of discrimination.42 Still other
scholars have documented how employees may respond to discrimination with strategies aimed at dispelling stereotypes that may attach to their identities.43 Taken together, this substantial body of
scholarship has led to considerable advances in our understandings
of the dynamics of discrimination in the modern workplace. However,
few scholars have sought to comprehensively theorize the interrelationships among all three drivers of inequality: bias, structure, and
employee responses to these phenomena.
In this Article, I try to juggle all three balls at once, so to speak,
that is, to re-theorize Title VII doctrine to account for the interplay
between organizational structures and discriminatory bias, on the
one hand, while also considering how employees commonly respond
to these demand side forms of discriminatory exclusion. This analysis
reveals that worker inequality is often the result of the interplay
between supply side and demand side processes. That is, in a broader
respect than has generally been appreciated, there is a dynamic
relationship among individual employee characteristics and
preferences, biased decisionmaking, and structural barriers to
41. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005); Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995).
42. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 104-08,
145-48 (2015) (documenting how discriminatory bias is perpetuated by the structures,
practices, and dynamics of workplace organizations and groups); Tristin K. Green, Work
Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623, 650 (2005) (explaining how organizational choices can both facilitate and constrain the development of discriminatory work cultures) [hereinafter Green, Work Culture]; Michael Selmi, Statistical Inequality and Intentional (Not Implicit) Discrimination, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 215-20 (2016) (discussing the “extensive literature” demonstrating that implicit bias can be controlled through
institutional interventions); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:
A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459-61 (2001) (describing “second generation” forms of bias as those that result from patterns of interaction, informal norms, networking, mentoring, and evaluation that produce differential access and opportunity).
43. See DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING RACE IN
POST-RACIAL AMERICA (2003); KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR
CIVIL RIGHTS passim (2006).
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worker equality. For example, individuals’ career aspirations and job
performance are shaped by both biased employment decisions and
the organization of work. Similarly, organizational arrangements can
serve to exacerbate or dampen discriminatory bias. Biased
decisionmaking and structural impediments to equality occur
simultaneously and combine and interact in dynamic ways that are
internalized by individual employees, affecting their “choices” and
work performance.44 In this view, discrimination is not an act or set
of acts (as contemplated by disparate treatment and systemic
disparate treatment) or a neutral policy with discriminatory effects
(as contemplated by disparate impact). Rather, discrimination is
more like a chain reaction involving individual worker behavior,
biased decisions, and the organization of work that, through a
process of positive feedback, produces and amplifies inequality. I
refer to this process as the “domino effect.”
In its most literal sense, the domino effect refers to the physics of
a row of toppling dominos.45 However, the concept has come to be
used in a variety of contexts either literally, to refer to an observed
series of physical collisions, or metaphorically, to describe causal
linkages within systems such as computer networks,46 global
finance,47 or politics.48 The metaphorical meanings of the term have
varied widely; at the most basic level, the idea denotes that a small
event may have unanticipated, far removed effects.49 A broader
44. Although beyond the scope of this project, the social supports available to individuals, as well as gendered dynamics of families, also have significant impacts on an individual’s labor market position. See Laura T. Kessler, Keeping Discrimination Theory Front and
Center in the Discourse Over Work and Family Conflict, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 313, 322-24 (2007).
45. See D.E. Shaw, Mechanics of a Chain of Dominoes, 46 AM. J. PHYSICS 640 (1978).
46. See Zhongqiang Chen et al., Malware Characteristics and Threats on the Internet
Ecosystem, 85 J. SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE 1650, 1659 (2012); Cassandra M. Kirsch, Science
Fiction No More: Cyber Warfare and the United States, 40 DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 620,
645-46 (2012).
47. See THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT 301 (2011); Hans Degryse et al., Domino Effects from Cross-Border Exposures, in
FINANCIAL CONTAGION: THE VIRAL THREAT TO THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 311-19 (Robert W.
Kolb ed., 2011).
48. For example, after World War II, the idea of the “domino theory” emerged to express the idea that the conversion of a free, noncommunist nation into a communist state
would trigger a chain reaction in neighboring countries. See DUNCAN TOWNSON, A
DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY 110 (1999). The domino theory became the basis
for U.S. foreign policy in the Vietnam War and has been used to describe the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe after 1989. Id. For a fuller treatment of the domino
theory, see FRANK NINKOVICH, MODERNITY AND POWER: A HISTORY OF THE DOMINO
THEORY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994).
49. This conception of the domino effect is similar to “the butterfly effect,” used to
describe the phenomenon, originating in chaos theory, whereby a minute localized change
in a complex system can have unpredictable, large effects elsewhere. See Edward N. Lorenz,
Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow, 20 J. ATMOSPHERIC SCI. 130 (1936); Edward N. Lorenz, Pro-
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conception, which I employ in this Article, is that a seemingly small
and insignificant incident can mushroom into a much larger,
comprehensive problem. As I will argue, in the employment context,
relatively small and insignificant discriminatory acts, policies, or work
structures oftentimes initiate a chain reaction resulting in substantial
and materially adverse forms of worker inequality, such as unequal
pay and status. In addition to highlighting this process, which has
been underexplored in legal scholarship, a key contribution of this
Article is to examine how employees’ responses to discrimination are
important to understanding the production of inequality.
It is important to note at the outset that I do not claim to
definitively describe or predict workplace domino effects with
certainty. Although social scientists have an ever-deepening
understanding of the processes of stereotyping, prejudice, and
discrimination,50 they have not arrived at any definitive theory. The
problem of hierarchy and inequality in the workplace is multifaceted.
Moreover, the precise character and manifestations of the domino
effect are likely to differ across occupational and organizational
contexts. Still, as I develop more fully below, social science research
employing a wide range of methodologies in a wide range of work
settings over a long period of time has consistently and reliably
identified institutional and social processes by which inequality is
created and maintained by organizations. This extensive body of
research demonstrates that demand side and supply side drivers of
worker inequality are not independent of one another. My objective is
to begin a conversation. How might Title VII’s major theories of
liability be modified, and what might a larger social policy agenda
look like, were we to reject the following two flawed premises of Title
VII: First, that inequality is a result either of the characteristics and
preferences of individual workers or biased decisionmaking and
organizational-level systems of stratification; and second, that there
is no causal relationship among these phenomena?
An immense reform agenda emerges when we consider the
implications of the domino effect for Title VII. For example, the
assumed independence of an employee’s work performance from
discriminatory employer actions in disparate treatment law becomes
incoherent once we account for the domino effect. This Article
fessor of Meteorology, Predictability; Does the Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set Off a
Tornado in Texas?, Address at the American Association for the Advancement of Science,
139th Meeting (Dec. 20, 1972), http://eaps4.mit.edu/research/Lorenz/Butterfly_1972.pdf.
50. Stereotypes are overgeneralized beliefs about individuals based on their group
membership. Prejudice has a more affective or emotional component and is defined as biased attitudes. Discrimination is a behavioral response to perceived difference (i.e., unfair
treatment). See Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 2
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357 (Daniel.T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).
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represents an effort to provide the initial empirical and theoretical
groundwork for the larger project. As a concrete starting point, this
Article focuses on two related policy contexts: sex-based employment
discrimination and worker inequality arising from work and family
conflict. These are especially fruitful domains of legal concern to
examine the workplace domino effect.
Lack of paid family leave, inflexible and unpredictable work
schedules, insufficient paid sick leave, the absence of accommodation
for the physical limitations of normal pregnancy,51 and long work
hours are common features of American workplaces that make it
difficult for employees who become pregnant or have significant
family responsibilities to perform as ideal workers.52 At the same
time, pregnancy and family care responsibilities can make an
employee’s sex and gender more salient in the workplace, triggering
animus or bias by coworkers and managers. Once either or both of
these processes are set in motion, a chain reaction often ensues. In
many instances, what may have begun as inconsequential, isolated,
or at least surmountable differences in employee availability or
energy become the justification for differential treatment, whether it
be differences in mentoring, training, and evaluation, for example, or
more serious consequences, such as failure to promote or even the
decision to terminate an employee. That is, structural barriers, bias,
and employee responses to discrimination often combine and
reinforce one another so as to produce substantial worker inequality.
Because these discriminatory dynamics are especially acute in the
context of work and family conflict, this is a fruitful area of
employment discrimination law to illustrate the operation of the
domino effect. Specifically, I use this particularized form of gender
discrimination as an example to illustrate how discrimination
commonly plays out inside work organizations, the effects it has on
individuals, and how it might be challenged. However, my extended
focus on gender discrimination and work and family conflict is not
51. There is guarded optimism that the Supreme Court’s decision in Young v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015), may result in more pregnant workers receiving
needed accommodations for common pregnancy-related physical limitations. However, the
evidentiary burden is still quite high. See discussion infra note 80. There is no right under
federal law to receive accommodations for normal pregnancy absent proof of disparate
treatment. See Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
961, 964 (2013). For an illuminating history of the struggles for “meaningful, rather than
formal, reproductive choice” leading to the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
see Mary Ziegler, Choice at Work: Young v. United Parcel Service, Pregnancy Discrimination, and Reproductive Liberty, 93 DENV. L. REV. 219, 274 (2015).
52. Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 371 passim (2001).
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meant to suggest that the domino effect is limited to this form of
discriminatory exclusion. For this reason, many of the empirical
studies and cases I discuss address race and other types of
discrimination, and this Article’s analysis should be useful to
scholars and advocates working to remedy discrimination across
identities and contexts. Its contributions operate on three levels:
doctrine, theory, and methodology.
First, at its most basic level, this Article aims to assist plaintiffs’
lawyers by distilling complicated processes of discrimination into a
simple, familiar, concept that can be used to frame Title VII
litigation. Most people—including judges and jurors—have at some
point in their lives witnessed the spectacle of dominos toppling in a
cascade. The analytical framework introduced in this Article can also,
ideally, persuade courts to update and reformulate Title VII doctrine
to better account for the dynamics of contemporary discrimination.
Second, on a broader theoretical level, this Article demonstrates
that the conceptual bifurcation of the causal mechanisms of worker
inequality into supply side or demand side categories is, in and of
itself, a political construct disguising the role of institutions and
markets in producing inequality. Orthodox economic theory, struggle
as it may, provides the basic template for this binary. According to
this strain of economics, sustained observed differences in economic
outcomes between groups are due to a deficiency in the group
experiencing the inferior outcomes.53 Economists refer to the
deficiency as one in human capital. Sometimes the deficiency is said
to be associated with poor schooling opportunities, other times with
culture, socialization, or motivation. But the thrust of the argument
is to absolve organizational and market processes of a role in
producing the differential outcome; the inherent deficiency is
theorized to occur in pre-market or extra-market processes. This
framework is woven into the very fabric of Title VII. Every major
proof structure under Title VII is built on this template, setting up a
conflict between alleged employee deficiencies, on the one hand, and
rational employer decisions and efficient work structures, on the
other. In this view, the trier of fact only needs to choose between
mutually exclusive explanations for bad worker outcomes. As this
Article demonstrates, this choice is overly simplistic, as even the
most basic forms of discriminatory exclusion, such as individual
disparate treatment, involve an interplay of demand side and supply
side factors.

53. William A. Darity Jr. & Patrick L. Mason, Evidence on Discrimination in Employment: Codes of Color, Codes of Gender, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 63, 83 (1998).
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Finally, this Article offers a methodological innovation. I assert
that a fruitful way to contest the pervasive influence of orthodox
economic theory on employment discrimination law is to marshal the
insights and theories from social sciences that take the “social” part
of their mission seriously.54 Sociology, social psychology, and
sociologically-grounded business management research on work
organizations, in particular, are promising fields for challenging
neoclassical economic foundations of employment discrimination law,
because they focus on organizational and societal-level systems of
social stratification. So many of Title VII’s theories of liability and
legal doctrines focus on the individual—that is, whether and to what
extent the individual employee is to blame for his or her
predicament—rather than the interplay between organizational
structures and individual agency. Disciplines and methodologies that
attend to the social dynamics inside work organizations and the
institutional practices that shape employee behavior offer an antidote
to the inordinate focus in Title VII doctrine on individual employees’
education, qualifications, training, merit, performance, and personal
choices.
Sociological and organizational-level understandings of worker
inequality can also serve as an important supplement to scholarly
work on unconscious bias in the workplace. In the past fifteen years,
the science of implicit cognition has achieved a firm foothold in the
legal field of discrimination law.55 Specifically, many legal scholars
54. For a longer explication of this strategy, see Laura T. Kessler, Getting Class, 56
BUFF. L. REV. 915, 929-30 (2008).
55. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination
Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 477 (2007); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn
and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2006); Katharine T.
Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing
Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1893-94 (2009); Gary Blasi,
Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 1241, 1241 (2002); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:
Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 945-46 (2006); Melissa Hart, Subjective
Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 741 (2005); Tanya
Katerí Hernández, One Path for “Post-Racial” Employment Discrimination Cases—The
Implicit Association Test Research as Social Framework Evidence, 32 L. & INEQ. 309, 31011 (2014); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV.
969, 969 (2006); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124,
1126 (2012) [hereinafter Kang, Courtroom Bias]; Kang, Trojan Horses, supra note 41, at
1490; Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan
T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and
Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 998-1003 (2006); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten
Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345,
354 (2007); Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title
VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 418 (2000); Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual
Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1093 (2008); Reshma M. Saujani, “The Implicit
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find special promise in a particular line of research in cognitive
psychology that measures bias with the Implicit Association Test or
“IAT.”56 The IAT assesses the existence and strength of racial,
gender, and other biases by measuring “response latency,” for
example, how long it takes to make a stereotype-consistent
association, such as “women” and “crochet,” as compared with the
time needed to make a stereotype-inconsistent association, such as
“women” and “strong.” Scholars who promote the IAT emphasize the
central role of unconscious bias in employer decisions.57
Unconscious or “implicit” bias refers to prejudiced judgments that
may affect our understandings, actions, and decisions.58 It is a type of
cognitive shortcut that occurs when our brains make quick
judgments and assessments of people and situations, informed by our
background, cultural environment, and personal experiences. Many
legal scholars see this brain science as having the potential to
transform how we understand and address discrimination
throughout the law, because so much discrimination law requires
proof of intent.59
Certainly, the science of implicit social cognition has been of some
assistance in educating judges and policymakers about the nature
and prevalence of bias, with important victories for this intellectual
movement.60 Still, there are limitations to the utility of this science as
a tool for achieving progressive legal change in the employment
Association Test”: A Measure of Unconscious Racism in Legislative Decision-Making, 8
MICH. J. RACE & L. 395, 397 (2003); Michael S. Shin, Redressing Wounds: Finding a Legal
Framework to Remedy Racial Disparities in Medical Care, 90 CAL. L. REV. 2047, 2064-65
(2002); Audrey J. Lee, Note, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 40 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 481, 482 (2005).
56. See About the IAT, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/
iatdetails.html [https://perma.cc/N3XJ-DBF5]. For a comprehensive history of the
development of the field of implicit cognition, and its use in legal projects, see Greenwald &
Krieger, supra note 55.
57. See sources cited supra note 55.
58. For example, a manager who sincerely believes that women and men are equally
suited for a particular job may nevertheless unconsciously associate women with the domestic sphere, and this implicit association might lead him to hire equally qualified men
over women.
59. See sources cited supra note 55. The seminal contribution is Linda Hamilton
Krieger’s 1995 law review article, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity. See Krieger, supra note 41.
60. See, e.g., Kimble v. Wis. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 775-76, 778
(E.D. Wis. 2010) (recognizing and relying on implicit bias cognitive studies in reaching a
holding that an employee established a prima facie case of race plus gender discrimination
when the employer denied the employee a raise on the basis of highly subjective evaluation
criteria); see also Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”:
Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and
Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1353-54 (2008) (noting the important role of implicit
bias in the EEOC’s and several federal courts’ understanding of employment
discrimination against family caregivers).
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context. Most research in the field focuses on individual-level
explanations of worker inequality and, therefore, may lack sufficient
power to challenge conservative economic and political theories that
similarly locate the cause of worker inequality inside the individual.61
In addition, deploying implicit bias research in law reform projects
has had the unforeseen consequence of perpetuating the
misconception that biased decisionmaking cannot be controlled, and
consequently, the belief that employers cannot reasonably be held
accountable for the resulting discrimination and inequality.62 Worse,
it risks sending the message that stereotyping is okay, since the
theory teaches that everyone has bias. This may make discrimination
seem socially acceptable and lessen the motivation to avoid it. Given
these risks and limitations, the project of achieving equality in the
workplace for protected groups requires a more robust account of the
interactions between bias and structural discrimination than
advocates of implicit bias research in law sometimes propose.63
Sociology, social psychology, and related fields in law and society,
such as new institutionalism and new legal realism, may help here,
because these fields contribute to our understandings of how
organizational- and societal-level systems of social stratification
61. Moreover, many courts have remained skeptical of implicit bias evidence and have
refused to find that discrimination existed without a showing of intent. Cf. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 355 (2011) (rejecting relevance of applied social
framework evidence in the context of class action) (“[L]eft to their own devices most
managers in any corporation . . . would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for
hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.”); see also Krieger &
Fiske, supra note 55, at 1034 (“Title VII’s operative text prohibits these subtle forms of
discrimination, but the science of implicit stereotyping has barely begun to influence
federal disparate treatment jurisprudence. Indeed, from a behavioral realist standpoint, in
many circuits, judicial conceptions of intergroup bias have actually regressed over the past
two decades, even as psychological science has surged toward an increasingly refined
understanding of the ways in which implicit prejudices bias the social judgments and
choices of even well-meaning people.”); Christopher Cerullo, Note, Everyone’s a Little Bit
Racist? Reconciling Implicit Bias and Title VII, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 127, 146-54 (2013)
(discussing cases rejecting implicit bias claims).
62. See Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereotype
Theory, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 919, 940-41 (2016) (suggesting that stereotyping theory
may be more useful than implicit bias in framing employment discrimination cases); Selmi,
supra note 42, at 215-20 (critiquing proponents of implicit bias for assuming that implicit
bias is uncontrollable and for failing to acknowledge that repeated behavior, in the face of
information that one’s behavior is discriminatory, is not implicit).
63. See generally Kessler, supra note 44 (discussing a broad array of institutional
arrangements and social structures that contribute to worker inequality, including the
educational system, gender dynamics in families, welfare law, and tax law); cf. Martha
Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition,
20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 1 (2008) (concentrating on “the structures our society has and
will establish” rather than individuals or defined identity groups, in an effort to move
“toward a more substantive vision of equality.”).
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facilitate inequality.64 To succeed in developing a more integrated
account, however, legal scholars must overcome the presumption that
unconscious bias and structural contributors to worker inequality are
unrelated to one another, thereby reinforcing the very same limiting
frameworks reflected in legal doctrine and embraced by courts.
Employment discrimination scholarship is roughly divided into two
subfields, one concentrating on unconscious bias and the other on the
institutional nature of discrimination. It would be beneficial to the
field of employment discrimination law to develop an account of the
interplay among different processes of discriminatory exclusion in
the workplace. Attending to the dynamic interplay among
individuals, organizations, and society in producing inequality is
likely to lead to a better understanding and reduction of genderbased and other forms of employment discrimination.65
Part II of this Article offers an extended fictional hypothetical
involving work and family conflict, gender and sexuality
discrimination, and sexual harassment to illustrate the workplace
domino effect. Through a legal analysis of the factual problem
presented, Part II then demonstrates how ill-equipped discrimination
law is to identify and remedy the common domino-like processes that
cause substantial worker inequalities.
Part III examines the prevailing conceptual frameworks that
social scientists and courts use to explain and understand genderbased worker inequality. Specifically, Section III.A. reviews social
science research on gender-based employment discrimination. This
review demonstrates that social scientists tend to view women’s
work-related choices, gender bias, and structural features of the
workplace as mutually exclusive phenomena. Section III.B. turns to
the analytical frameworks that guide how employment
discrimination cases are litigated, including disparate treatment,
systemic disparate treatment, and disparate impact. It shows how
these frameworks also, almost uniformly, assume that employee’s
choices and behaviors, employer bias, and exclusionary work
structures are independent drivers of worker inequality.
Part IV sketches a more accurate, multidimensional account of the
dynamic processes by which worker inequality is created and
reinforced inside work organizations. This discussion draws from a
variety of fields, primarily sociology and social psychology, but also
64. See Barbara F. Reskin & Denise D. Bielby, A Sociological Perspective on Gender
and Career Outcomes, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 71 (2005) (explaining how the sociological
and economic approaches to research on gender and career outcomes differ).
65. My comments here are not intended as a broad indictment of implicit bias research or its use in discrimination law. However, productive work remains to be done in
connecting this research with the organizational literature discussed in this Article.
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from business management research on organizations, new
institutionalism, feminist legal theory, and critical race theory. The
research reviewed in Part IV demonstrates that various processes of
discrimination, such as biased decisionmaking and structural
impediments to equality, occur simultaneously and combine and
interact in ways that amplify discrimination, oftentimes with the aid
of a process of psychological internalization of its targets, resulting in
tangible harm to employees.
Part V explores a number of interventions that follow from this
Article’s main empirical and theoretical contributions on the
workplace domino effect. Specifically, Section V.A. discusses
voluntary measures that employers can adopt to disrupt the feedback
loops among processes of discrimination documented in this Article.
These voluntary measures are evidence-based and therefore should
be effective if there is a commitment to preventing and remedying
discrimination. In Section V.B., recognizing that employers’
commitment to antidiscrimination is oftentimes lacking without the
risk of liability, I explore litigation strategies and logical revisions to
several core doctrines in Title VII legal jurisprudence that would
allow the law to better address the workplace domino effect.
In formulating solutions, I proceed from two working
commitments: First, there is a grave mismatch between what we
know from social science about how discrimination operates today
and the model we inherited from fifty years ago, which does not
account for the dynamic interaction among employee choices, bias,
and structural features of the workplace that produce inequality.
This mismatch goes well beyond the oft-discussed failure of Title VII
to account for the unconscious nature of bias. Second, despite the
major setbacks that Title VII has suffered in the past several
decades, and plaintiffs’ consequent difficulties proving employment
discrimination, developing transformational analytic frameworks
that can illuminate the social processes of inequality is an important
and necessary project for employment scholars.66 Disparate
66. Given the limitations of using litigation and employment discrimination law to
end worker inequality, legal scholars increasingly are turning to conceptual frameworks
that do not turn on proving discrimination on the basis of group membership. For example,
policy discussions surrounding work and family conflict have progressed over the past few
decades from demands to end sex discrimination and provide maternity leave to a general
problem of “family leave,” and more recently, to the concept of “work-life balance” for
everyone. See Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in
Workplace Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1221 (2011) (discussing this trend). Other
scholars have proposed laws modeled on minimum labor standards that do not require
proof of discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination:
American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1341
(2012) (proposing increased use of “extra-discrimination” approaches that do not focus on
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treatment law, in particular, is a critical component of this work.
Although disparate treatment has always served as the practical and
conceptual core of Title VII, it is now all the more important to
dedicate energy to reinvigorating individual claims, given the Court’s
apparent hostility to systemic claims of employment discrimination.
II. THE DOMINO EFFECT: A HYPOTHETICAL
In order to illustrate the workplace domino effect and the current
failure of employment discrimination law to address it, I offer in this
Part a hypothetical. The hypothetical draws from my observations
and from stories that I have heard and read in the course of my
research on employment discrimination during my years in law
teaching. Other information comes from empirical and qualitative
studies and fact patterns of cases brought under Title VII. I use the
example of an academic workplace because it is what I know best,
although the workplace domino effect is likely generalizable to many
workplaces.
A. Hypothetical
A talented young scientist takes a full-time position as an
assistant pharmacology professor on the tenure track at a major
research university. At the beginning of her sixth year, the faculty
member will be expected to document her accomplishments, and
these are reviewed by faculty at other institutions and at various
levels within the university. The review will use the three criteria of
research, teaching, and service, with the most important criterion
being research.
In her first year on the faculty, while alone in her office working
late one evening, an older, tenured male colleague stops by to chat.
During this conversation, he suggests they go out for a drink. He
makes a point to explain that his wife is out of town. She is
uncomfortable, anxious, and not sure how to respond. He is a
potential resource for her scholarship and professional advancement,
as they work in closely related fields in pharmacology, and he will
ultimately vote on her tenure. The combination of his welcome
professional support and unwelcome romantic attention presents the
group-based discrimination claims). In a similar vein, some legal scholars have explored
procedural approaches to addressing discrimination, such as requiring employers to
establish meaningful procedures for responding to requests for flexible work schedules or
requiring pay transparency in an effort to improve the ability of employees to negotiate for
fair pay. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process: Toward an
Incentivized Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment Quality for Caregivers,
2007 UTAH L. REV. 25, 26-27; Gowri Ramachandran, Pay Transparency, 116 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 1043, 1043 (2012).
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unsettling possibility that objecting to the latter may cost her the
former.67 She smiles and explains that her husband is keeping dinner
warm and politely declines. He leaves, and she packs up her bag and
immediately goes home, resolving not to work late alone in her office
anymore. After this incident, the untenured professor tries to avoid
this colleague whenever possible. She is mostly successful in this
effort, except for the weekly faculty scholarship lunch, when, on more
than one occasion, he stands behind her in the buffet line and places
both hands on her shoulders. She does not share these incidents with
anyone at work. Although extremely unsettling, she does not believe
they are serious enough to report, and she also wonders if perhaps
she sent the wrong signals in the beginning by being extremely
friendly and seeking out this colleague to discuss their scholarship.
Better, she decides, just to stay away.
The faculty member becomes pregnant the following year, after
three years on the faculty, and negotiates with her dean to teach an
overload in her third trimester in return for a “paid” family leave the
following fall.68 In the past, the department has authorized reduced
teaching loads on an informal basis for other faculty members for
various personal and family reasons. For example, one colleague
received a light teaching load while he was going through a
contentious divorce; another was given a course release for a
demanding public service position; a third colleague received a light
teaching load while going through treatment for a curable cancer,
although there was no formal request for an accommodation by the
employee. However, her dean explains that there is no precedent for
any faculty member being granted a paid family leave, and therefore,
he offers the “compromise” of permitting her to frontload her
expected teaching, which she accepts as the best of two less than
ideal options—taking a significant reduction in salary or doubling
her workload at the end of pregnancy. Pursuant to university policy,
she elects to stop her tenure-clock for one academic year.
The professor’s teaching evaluations, which were previously
outstanding, decline while she is teaching the overload during the

67. Here, I am paraphrasing Harvard law professor Jeannie Suk Gersen’s description of her
reaction to an incident of sexual harassment that she experienced. See Jeannie Suk Gersen, The
Case Against Fox News, NEW YORKER (Aug. 26, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/the-case-against-fox-news [https://perma.cc/T244-PVHT].
68. Cf. Laura T. Kessler, Paid Family Leave in American Law Schools: Findings and
Open Questions, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 661, 690 (2006) (finding that twenty-seven percent of the
sampled law schools offered no paid family leave, and that among these law schools, a
common strategy for wage replacement by legal-academic employees taking family leave is
to front-load teaching).
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third trimester of her pregnancy.69 Some of the evaluations directly
comment on her energy level. Other students are upset about her
failure to give all reading assignments at the beginning of the
semester, even though many of her colleagues regularly release
reading assignments in increments without negative consequences.
One student complains that the professor, by incorporating her
scholarship into the reading assignments, wasted their time on her
“pet projects.”
The baby is born without complications in the summer after her
fourth year on the faculty. Upon returning from her family leave, she
is assigned especially heavy committee responsibilities, which is only
fair “because she missed a whole semester.”
Given the recent dip in her teaching evaluations, she dedicates
even more time to preparing her classes and making herself available
to students. Fearing adverse reactions by students and colleagues to
her status as a new mother, the professor also goes out of her way to
strategically minimize or hide her family life at work. Unlike many of
her colleagues, she avoids displaying pictures of her newborn on her
office door or her spouse on her desk, maximizes her time in her
office with her door open, attends all faculty meetings, and accepts
virtually all requests to attend evening dinners and departmental
events. The extra energy dedicated to teaching and performing this
“identity work” takes time away from her scholarship. She squeezes
in her writing at night, when her family is asleep. Because she has a
young child at home, she is limited in her ability to travel to research
conferences where networking takes place.
Every morning when the faculty member dresses for work, she
carefully considers what she will wear. She wants to be taken
seriously, and must therefore juggle the different impressions created
by her outfit choices. Formal suits signal authority but come off as
stuffy. Dresses and skirts are uncomfortable in her cold lab. Yet she
cannot simply wear slacks, a shirt, and a tie, the uniform of the

69. There is considerable research demonstrating that student evaluations of faculty
members’ teaching are infected with unconscious bias. Both male and female students
generally give lower teaching evaluations to women faculty members than to male faculty
members, and they give minority faculty members significantly lower evaluations than
white professors. See Sylvia R. Lazos, Are Student Teaching Evaluations Holding Back
Women and Minorities? The Perils of “Doing” Gender and Race in the Classroom, in
PRESUMED INCOMPETENT: THE INTERSECTIONS OF RACE AND CLASS FOR WOMEN IN
ACADEMIA 164-85 (Gutiérrez y Muhs et al. eds., 2012); Christine Haight Farley,
Confronting Expectations: Women in the Legal Academy, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 333, 336
(1996); Daniel S. Hamermesh & Amy Parker, Beauty in the Classroom: Instructors’
Pulchritude and Putative Pedagogical Productivity, 24 ECON. EDUC. REV. 369, 373 (2005);
Deborah J. Merritt, Bias, the Brain, and Student Evaluations of Teaching, 82 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 235, 235-36 (2008).
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tenured male faculty, or show up to work in black jeans and a hoodie,
like her “cool and talented” junior male colleagues.70
The pharmacology professor is ultimately granted tenure, but she
is given a rating of very good rather than excellent in scholarship.
Some colleagues feel that she should have published more papers
than her peers without children, given that she had an extra year on
her tenure clock. A male colleague, who had his first child before
tenure, opted not to take a family leave. Rather, he canceled two
weeks of classes after the birth and scheduled four make-up classes.
The students, although inconvenienced, did not hold it against him in
his evaluations, which included statements such as, “Give this man
tenure.” Although he produced essentially the same quantity and
quality of scholarship as the female professor, he receives a rating of
“excellent” in scholarship in his tenure review.
Both faculty members are now associate professors. At this point,
the female professor works, on average, forty-four hours per week.
(Her spouse works in finance. Although they are committed to
sharing childcare and housework equally, the pharmacology
professor spends more time on domestic tasks than her spouse,
because her schedule is more flexible.) Her male colleague with a
young child works, on average, about fifty hours per week, because
his spouse is a stay-at-home parent and serves as the primary
caregiver of their child.
Over time, the male colleague is rewarded with subtle perks and
resources that facilitate his research, productivity, and reputation.
For example, he is assigned one of the better administrative
assistants and top graduate students are steered in his direction to
work in his lab. His assigned laboratory space is larger and better
equipped. He is typically given a mid-week teaching schedule
favorable to traveling to outside conferences. Enrollment caps are
placed on his classes, which reduces his class sizes and grading
time.71 His research is featured on the department’s website and in

70. The pressures on women to perform their gender exactly right with clothing in the
workplace and other public realms has been discussed by many authors. Two classic
statements are Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance
Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2547
(1994), and Patricia J. Williams, Have Pantsuit, Will Travel, NATION (Aug. 27, 2008),
https://www.thenation.com/article/have-pantsuit-will-travel/ [https://perma.cc/M45L-Y7S8].
71. In-group favoritism, whereby individuals value and favor their own membership
groups over groups to which they do not belong, is among the most well-established
phenomena in social psychology. See Marilynn B. Brewer, The Importance of Being We:
Human Nature and Intergroup Relations, 62 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 728, 729 (2007) (reviewing
research). Thus, employment discrimination often manifests not as hostility toward the
out-group, but as in-group favoritism. See Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Favoritism: The
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external communications. He is appointed as the associate dean for
research, a two-year position that involves some additional
administrative tasks but which is more than compensated for by its
reputational value, permanent bump in salary, and accompanying
course release. This service creates a very favorable reaction by the
male dean of the department, who views the work as especially
generous given the male professor’s family commitments.
The female professor is given fewer course releases, a less
favorable teaching schedule, and less competitive students to assist
with her research (who need more mentoring and support). Because
there are relatively few women on the faculty, the female faculty
member is asked to serve on more committees—especially
committees that represent the department outside the university,
such as faculty recruitment. This additional service burden causes
her to lose valuable research time, as well as valuable outside
consultancies that earn her male colleagues additional income. The
female faculty member’s scholarship is less promoted in external
communications by the department, and she is less noted and
applauded internally for her faculty service than are her male
colleagues.72 When she occasionally misses a faculty meeting, her
absence is more likely to be noticed (a few wonder, “Is she home with
her kid?”), and when she attends, her contributions carry less weight.
She is limited to a relatively narrow personality range. Students and
colleagues expect her to be patient and understanding, rather than
busy and ambitious.
After ten years on the faculty, male colleagues with children and
male and female colleagues without children begin to leapfrog over
the woman in receiving promotions to full professor, which comes
with additional prestige, an increased research and travel budget,
and a higher salary. She has never applied for a promotion to full
professor. The custom in her department is for one or more colleagues
Subtle Side of Intergroup Discrimination, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH
INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 59 (David M. Messick & Anne E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996).
72. Social psychological research shows that organizational citizenship behaviors such
as helping others, courtesy, avoiding complaining even when justified (i.e., “good sportsmanship”), and civic engagement (e.g., attending meetings) is evaluated differently for
women than for men. Being helpful is a female stereotype. Therefore, when women do not
engage in organizational citizenship behaviors, they are viewed less favorably than identically behaving men. Moreover, when they do engage in organizational citizenship, it is less
noted and applauded than when men do. That is, women benefit less from being good citizens, and they are penalized more when they are not. See Tammy D. Allen, Rewarding Good
Citizens: The Relationship Between Citizenship Behavior, Gender, and Organizational Rewards, 36 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 120, 134 (2006); Madeline E. Heilman & Julie J. Chen,
Same Behavior, Different Consequences: Reactions to Men’s and Women’s Altruistic Citizenship Behavior, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 431, 440 (2005); see also Deborah L. Kidder & Judi
McLean Parks, The Good Soldier: Who is S(he)?, 22 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 939 passim
(2001) (theorizing why organizational citizenship behaviors are affected by gender roles).
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who are full professors to encourage or invite associate professors to
“apply.”73 As no one has ever encouraged her, she has not felt
comfortable asking to be considered for a promotion. In any case, she
thinks the effort would be futile. Seven of the ten full professors are
men and none has young children. There are no written standards for
promotion to full professor; the decision is made after a discussion
and simple vote and recommendation of the existing full professors.
She is nationally recognized, has made important contributions to
her field, and her publication record and grant-funding history are
equal or superior to at least half of her colleagues who are full
professors. Yet, she decides, it would be better not to push it for now.
In the big scheme of things, she should feel lucky, she thinks to
herself. As a tenured professor, she has reached the top of the
privilege and status hierarchy—by all external measures, she enjoys
levels of autonomy, prestige, and economic reward that are unusual
compared to the average worker.74
73. This tapping process is common in professional workplaces and is illustrated by
the controversial remarks of Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella, who, at a 2014 conference intended to celebrate women in computing, suggested that women in technology should not
ask for raises but rather “trust that the system would reward them.” See Nick Wingfield,
Microsoft’s Nadella Sets Off a Furor on Women’s Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2014, at B1. “Because that’s good karma,” according to Nadella. Id. “It’ll come back because somebody’s
going to know that’s the kind of person that I want to trust.” Id. Read between the lines,
Nadella’s remarks betray an unfavorable view of women who are as pushy as men in asking for raises. The irony, of course, is that when women do not negotiate for raises or promotions, as they so often do not, courts have interpreted their unassertiveness as evidence
of their lack of interest, placing them in a classic double bind. See Vicki Schultz, Telling
Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749
passim (1990). See generally LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK:
NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE (2007).
74. This rationalization is consistent with research on gender-based differences in job
satisfaction. All else being equal, women tend to report higher overall job satisfaction than
men, irrespective of whether they face gender barriers or discrimination at work. Therefore, reported job satisfaction is not a reliable measure of a fair or equal workplace. See
Andrew E. Clark, Job Satisfaction and Gender: Why Are Women So Happy at Work?, 4 LAB.
ECON. 341, 365 (1997) (finding that women have higher job satisfaction than men because
they have low expectations); William Magee, Anxiety, Demoralization, and the Gender Difference in Job Satisfaction, 69 SEX ROLES 308, 318 (2013) (“Women who report symptoms of
demoralization [by work] report being more satisfied with their jobs than men who report
demoralization.”); P. J. Sloane & H. Williams, Job Satisfaction, Comparison Earnings, and
Gender, 14 LAB. 473, 496 (2000) (finding that women express themselves as more satisfied
with their job than men, despite lower pay); cf. A. Sousa-Poza & A. A. Sousa-Poza, Gender
Differences in Job Satisfaction in Great Britain, 1991–2000: Permanent or Transitory?, 10
APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 691, 694 (2003) (finding that women’s job satisfaction in England
halved from 1991-2000 because of increased expectations).
In addition to the “low expectations” hypothesis, there are two alternative explanations
for women’s relatively higher levels of job satisfaction despite their experience of discrimination. Some studies suggest that men and women value aspects of a job differently, so
objective reward measures (such as pay) may mean less to women than men when compared with measures such as flexibility or the intrinsic returns of work. See Keith A. Bend-
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B. Legal Analysis
In the hypothetical scenario presented, the employee has limited
rights under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), the Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), or Title VII. Under Title VII, she has
a right to work in an environment free of sex-based unwelcome
conduct that is intimating, hostile, or abusive. However, isolated and
sporadic incidents such as those that she endured do not rise to the
level of illegality,75 even though her colleague’s behavior was
troubling enough to cause her to avoid him, which interfered with her
work and resulted in potentially lost opportunities of support for her
development as a young scholar. Moreover, courts generally have not
permitted plaintiffs to aggregate sexual harassment evidence with
evidence of other “non-sexual” forms of sex discrimination (such as
sex-based disparate treatment) to sustain a sexual harassment
claim.76 Therefore, the generalized conditions that have made it
difficult for her to flourish in her position will, as a matter of law, be
sliced and diced into smaller, discrete harms that seem relatively
trivial when considered out of context. Finally, because the harassing
colleague did not have the authority to effect a significant change in
the professor’s employment status—in the tenure process, he was
just one vote on a larger faculty—the professor’s claim for sexual
harassment against the university would likely be foreclosed in any
case.77 She did not report the harassment, and most courts would find
that this constituted an unreasonable failure to take advantage of

er et al., Job Satisfaction and Gender Segregation, 57 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 479, 481
(2005); Andrew E. Clark, What Really Matters in a Job? Hedonic Measurement Using Quit
Data, 8 LAB. ECON. 223, 224 (2001). A second theory is that dissatisfied women self-select
out of the labor market, a form of selection bias, but studies have refuted this hypothesis.
See, e.g., Clark, Job Satisfaction and Gender, supra, at 343; Alfonso Sousa-Poza & Andrés
A. Sousa-Poza, The Effect of Job Satisfaction on Labor Turnover by Gender: An Analysis for
Switzerland, 36 J. SOCIO-ECON. 895, 910 (2007).
75. Courts have narrowly defined sexual harassment as severe and pervasive conduct
that a reasonable person would consider intimidating, hostile, or abusive. See Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775
(1998); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (noting
that Title VII was not meant to be “a general civility code for the American workplace.”);
Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N (Mar. 19, 1990), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/currentissues.html [https://perma.cc/
FL6A-ETVW] (“Unless the conduct is quite severe, a single incident or isolated incidents of
offensive sexual conduct or remarks generally do not create an abusive environment.”).
76. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683,
1713-14 (1993) (discussing the disaggregation of sexual harassment from disparate treatment, so that “only overtly sexual conduct counts toward establishing hostile work environment harassment and that nonsexual conduct must be considered—if at all—as a separate form of disparate treatment.”).
77. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 431 (2013) (requiring proof of negligence to sustain a claim of sexual harassment by a coworker).
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preventive and corrective opportunities under these circumstances,78
even though she responded like most victims in these situations:
through avoidance.79
Under the PDA, she was entitled to a paid family leave without
teaching an overload if the employer provided paid leave to other
similarly situated workers. If so, by denying paid leave, the employer
was arguably discriminating against her based on pregnancy.
However, the employer may interpose a valid reason for the
distinction, arguing, for example, that a paid course release was
provided to her colleague for a comparably different situation,
because his leave during his period of public service was related to
his professional work and could ultimately benefit the school’s
reputation.80 If this distinction has a legitimate institutional basis,
the PDA claim may be unavailing.
Fortunately, unlike many part-time and low-wage workers, the
professor was eligible for job-protected family leave under the
FMLA.81 The birth of her child was a qualifying event,82 and she had
at least 1,250 hours of service for the university during the twelve
months prior to her leave for an employer with fifty or more
employees.83 However, the FMLA did not give her the ability to insist
on a paid leave.
78. See Hébert, supra note 31, at 733 (“Women who use more informal and interpersonal methods of dealing with sexual harassment are often portrayed as ‘doing nothing,’ a
characterization that makes it more likely that courts will find their failure to take proactive steps to deal with the harassment unreasonable.” (footnote omitted)).
79. See Beiner, supra note 32, at 315-16 (reporting that half of women who are sexually
harassed are reluctant to report the harassment because they do not think it is serious enough).
80. Identifying acceptable comparators is an eternal challenge for employment discrimination plaintiffs. This example brings to mind the recent Supreme Court decision of
Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). Peggy Young worked as a delivery driver for United Parcel Service (UPS). Id. at 1344. When she became pregnant, her
doctor advised her not to lift more than twenty pounds during her first twenty weeks of
pregnancy and no more than ten pounds thereafter. Id. UPS refused to transfer her to a
desk job, even though it had provided this accommodation to many men who experienced
comparable short-term disabilities, and even to men who had lost their Department of
Transportation driving certifications for drunk driving. Id. at 1347. UPS maintained the
position that these employees held were not appropriate comparators, because their situations were allegedly too different to qualify as “similarly situated.” Id. Ultimately, the
Court held that these employees could, as a matter of law, serve as appropriate comparators to create an inference of discrimination, but only if the plaintiff can demonstrate that
the defendant accommodates a “large percentage” of such workers, while failing to accommodate a “large percentage” of pregnant workers. Id. at 1354. For a critique of the judiciary’s almost religious devotion to comparators in discrimination law, and the limiting effects of this methodology, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120
YALE L.J. 728 (2011).
81. See Kessler, supra note 52, at 422-23 (discussing features of the FMLA that limit
its coverage primarily to economically privileged workers).
82. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A) (2012).
83. See id. §§ 2611(2), 2611(4) (2012).
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The professor may have a retaliation claim for being given heavy
committee work upon return from her family leave. An employer is
prohibited from retaliating against an employee for taking FMLA
leave,84 and the Supreme Court has defined retaliation broadly as
any action that a reasonable employee would find materially
adverse.85 However, courts have often faltered in enforcing the law’s
goal of achieving equal employment opportunity when retaliation
takes on more subtle, less tangible, non-economic forms.86 The
employer therefore might argue, for example, that in the larger
scheme of things, the heavy committee assignment did not constitute
a meaningful change in work responsibilities. Alternatively, the
employer might argue that her assignments were consistent with the
practice of periodically assigning faculty to heavy-workload
committees. On a small faculty, it may be difficult to show a genderbased pattern. Moreover, although the law is still developing, a few
district courts have held that a claim of retaliation under the FMLA
must meet a higher “but-for” causation standard rather than the
easier-to-prove “motivating factor” standard.87
84. See id. § 2615(a)(1) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2012).
85. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67-68 (2006). Although
the Burlington standard characterized how harmful retaliation must be to fall within Title
VII’s antiretaliation provision, it has been widely applied to other federal discrimination
statutes, including the FMLA. See Michael C. Harper, Fashioning a General Common Law
for Employment in an Age of Statutes, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1281, 1325-27 (2015).
86. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Parsing the Meaning of “Adverse Employment Action” in Title VII Disparate Treatment, Sexual Harassment, and Retaliation Claims: What
Should Be Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 623, 624 (2003); Brian A. Riddell &
Richard A. Bales, Adverse Employment Action in Retaliation Cases, 34 U. BALT. L. REV.
313, 313-15 (2005); Autumn George, Comment, “Adverse Employment Action”—How Much
Harm Must Be Shown to Sustain a Claim of Discrimination Under Title VII?, 60 MERCER
L. REV. 1075, 1107-08 (2009).
87. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court held that the “mixed-motive” proof structure is unavailable to prove retaliation claims under Title VII. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med.
Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360-61 (2013). As a result, for Title VII retaliation claims,
employees are now subject to a much more demanding standard that a protected activity—
such as complaining about discrimination, filing a discrimination charge, resisting harassment, or cooperating in a discrimination investigation—was the “but-for cause” of the
employer’s retaliation against the employee. See id. The Court determined Title VII retaliation claims “must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation.” Id.
This holding eliminated the less onerous motivating-factor standard of adjudicating Title
VII retaliation claims, in which a claimant could show “race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for—and not necessarily the but-for factor in—the challenged employment action.” Id. at 2528.
A Department of Labor regulation that predates Nassar, section 825.220(c), provides
that “employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment
actions, such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions.” Id. The “factor” language
makes clear that the “but for” standard should not apply to FMLA retaliation cases. The
Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits and several district courts in other circuits have reasoned that the regulation deserves Chevron deference, see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and, therefore, have held that the proper causation
standard for retaliation claims under the FMLA is mixed-motive, see Woods v. START
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Beyond the immediate circumstances surrounding her family
leave, note also, the FMLA does not provide our professor with a
right to a flexible work arrangement or reduced work hours to care
for her healthy child after the initial twelve-week leave period.
The professor could also allege intentional “sex-plus” discrimination
because of her status as a woman with children. “Sex-plus”
discrimination is discrimination based on sex in conjunction with some
other characteristic, such as having young children.88 Proceeding on
this theory, she could argue that she was treated unfairly vis-à-vis her
male colleague with a young child who was given a lighter teaching
load, better administrative support, the best Ph.D. candidates,
superior laboratory space and equipment, greater presence on the
department’s website, a more favorable teaching schedule, more course
releases, an appointment as the research dean, and, ultimately,
promotion to full professor. Under the sex-plus doctrine, the fact that
some women without young children were treated favorably or
promoted to full professor should not automatically defeat her claim.
Moreover, according to the “mixed-motive” rule, she could potentially
establish liability simply by showing that gender motivated her
employer’s actions,89 rather than having to prove that gender was the
but-for cause of its actions favoring her male colleague.
Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2017); Egan v. Del. River Port
Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 274 (3d Cir. 2017); Hunter v. Valley View Local Sch., 579 F.3d 688,
691-92 (6th Cir. 2009); Chase v. U.S. Postal Serv., 149 F. Supp. 3d 195, 210 (D. Mass.
2016), aff’d on other grounds, 843 F.3d 553, 559 n.2 (1st Cir. 2016); cf. Walters v. Mayo
Clinic Health Sys.—Eau Claire Hosp., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1080 (W.D. Wis. 2015)
(“[T]he FMLA regulation at issue here contains the express language . . . necessary to allow
for something other than ‘but for causation.’ ”). However, a few district courts have reached
the opposite conclusion, treating Nassar as a controlling precedent for FMLA retaliation
claims and therefore applying the but-for causation standard to such claims. See Gourdeau
v. City of Newton, 238 F. Supp. 3d 179, 183-95 (D. Mass. 2017); Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
No. 2:14-CV-1640-WMA, 2016 WL 4259753, at *4-6 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 12, 2016); Taylor v.
Rite Aid Corp., 993 F. Supp. 2d 551, 567 (D. Md. 2014). Many courts, including the Fifth
and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal, have simply avoided deciding the question by holding that the plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim could survive both the “but for” and “motivating factor” standard, or neither. See, e.g., Castay v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 604 F. App’x
355, 356 n.2 (5th Cir. 2015); Malin v. Hospira, Inc., 762 F.3d 552, 562 n.3 (7th Cir. 2014);
Elzeneiny v. District of Columbia, 195 F. Supp. 3d 207, 221 (D.D.C. 2016). The Supreme
Court has thus far declined to take up the question, see Bartels v. S. Motors of Savannah,
Inc., 681 F. App’x 834, 840 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 358 (2017); therefore,
uncertainty remains in many circuits about the proper causation standard for FMLA retaliation claims.
88. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
89. With the exception of age discrimination claims, which are subject to a strict “butfor” causation standard, see Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), an
employee may prevail in one of two ways in a disparate treatment case. First, if the factfinder believes the employer’s decision was motivated exclusively by discriminatory
reasons. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993); Tex. Dep’t of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
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However, even with the benefit of these plaintiff-friendly Title VII
doctrines (sex-plus and mixed-motive), success will turn on at least
two challenges. First, she will have to prove that the subtle actions
“favoring” her male colleague with children were, in effect, adverse
employment actions disfavoring her. It will be difficult to
demonstrate, for example, that being assigned a less competent
administrative assistant or graduate students, not being mentored or
featured on the department’s website, or even being assigned inferior
lab space,90 constitute adverse employment actions,91 and proving
some of these matters would involve challenging satellite
determinations of the qualifications and competence of staff and
students assigned to work for her. Second, she will need to
demonstrate that her performance is comparable to or better than
her male colleague’s. This may prove difficult where decisionmaking
processes are opaque and guided by subjective factors, as is the case
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Second, she may prevail if she proves that the employer’s decision
was motivated by discriminatory and nondiscriminatory reasons, the latter being sufficient
to motivate the adverse decision. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93-94
(2003); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1989). In the latter “mixedmotive” situation, according to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the employer is in violation of
Title VII, because it took account of the employee’s protected status in making an
employment decision. However, if the employer would have made the same decision in the
absence of the discrimination, the plaintiff’s remedy is limited to declaratory and injunctive
relief, attorney’s fees, and costs (i.e., no damages, back pay, or reinstatement). Civil Rights
Act of 1991 § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2012).
90. See, e.g., Summy-Long v. Pa. State Univ., 226 F. Supp. 3d 371, 417-21 (M.D. Pa.
2016) (holding that a female pharmacology professor was not subjected to adverse
employment actions by reduction of her laboratory space, delayed placement of her profile
on website, or alleged mistreatment by administrative staff); Mitchell v. Vanderbilt Univ.,
No. 3:01-1578, 2003 WL 24135107, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2003) (holding that
reduction of a microbiology professor’s lab space “does not rise to the level of a firing,
demotion, or loss of benefits”).
91. The employer’s intent can be established with either direct or indirect evidence.
Direct evidence is evidence that directly proves a fact, without an inference—for example,
the statement by a supervisor, “I did not promote you because you are a woman.” It is
unlikely that the professor will have direct evidence, because most employers have trained
their supervisors not to express any discriminatory motives they might harbor. See Chad
Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and
the Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177, 1207 (2003) (noting that as
soon as Title VII became law, “no sensible employer would admit that it based a decision
on one of the prohibited classifications.”); see also Mark Schwartz, et al., Ass’n Corp.
Counsel, Mixed-Motive Cases: What Now After Desert Palace v. Costa, ACC DOCKET, Mar.
2004, at 58-59 (“[Y]our company should be even more vigilant in educating its supervisors
and employees not to tell jokes or use derogatory or stereotypical language in the
workplace based on race, national origin, religion, gender, age, or other protected factors.
You should review your company’s diversity training and equal employment compliance
programs to ensure that they include discussion about jokes and off-color remarks.
Although truly isolated jokes or comments still should not be admissible as “stray remarks”
or otherwise, the prevalence of such comments may be admissible to establish that the
company facilitates prejudices that lead to unlawful discrimination.”).
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in many employment contexts. When it comes to subjective
evaluations of employee performance, courts have tended to defer to
employers’ determinations. She could argue that her employer’s
actions were still to some extent influenced by the seeming
incongruity of being a mother with young children and a scientist.
Perhaps. But it will be tough to do so without direct evidence, such as
hostile statements evidencing a discriminatory motive.
Finally, under the proof structure for intentional disparate
treatment, the discriminatory and legitimate, nondiscriminatory
“reasons” for an employer’s decisions will be viewed as mutually
exclusive. She is working “twice as hard” to combat biased teaching
evaluations and potential negative perceptions of being a mother,
which the employer, in the case of assigning her a teaching overload
in her third trimester of pregnancy, did not take measures to combat
and may have facilitated. She has also been given a greater volume of
service and other assignments that are inconsistent with research. In
contrast, her male colleague has flourished under ideal work
conditions that included, among other benefits, resources and
support that freed up his time for research, as well as grooming for
leadership. When sustained over a career, the differential allocation
of resources, while seemingly inconsequential in isolation, are likely
to accrete, diminishing productivity and other indicia of success.
Finally, the job—its hours and requirements—is designed around the
assumption that the worker who occupies her position has the benefit
of a stay-at-home partner to cover the domestic-side of life. Yet in the
legal analysis of her disparate treatment claim under the established
disparate treatment proof structure, her performance will be treated
as an independent, legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for the
employer’s actions. And because she never applied for a promotion,
her employer will claim that she is not a full professor because of her
apparent lack of interest, rather than any discriminatory motive. As
Vicki Schultz’s scholarship has thoroughly documented, courts have
generally sided with employers when they raise this “lack of interest”
argument, even if the apparent lack of interest is a result of the
chilling effects of an employer’s discriminatory practices.92
Thus, the PDA, the FMLA, and Title VII, as presently configured,
are inadequate solutions to gender-based discrimination against
family caregivers, or, more generally, to the cascading patterns of
discrimination that result in substantial worker inequality. As this
example illustrates, although the PDA protects pregnant workers
from some forms of differential treatment, it is helpful only in
92. Schultz, supra note 73.
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situations where comparable non-pregnant employees are treated
more favorably. It is completely silent on issues of caregiver
discrimination that occur after pregnancy.93 The FMLA does mandate
some recognition of the real effects of caregiving, but it does so only
in the context of birth or serious illness, ignoring the burdens
imposed by the everyday demands of caregiving, which can continue
for many years. Finally, and crucially, even the less onerous “mixedmotive” theory of intentional discrimination is generally unable to
account for the dynamic interactions among individual employee
choices, bias, and discriminatory structures inside the workplace.
That is, bias and structural discrimination are mutually
reinforcing—and they produce so-called “real differences” that are
then accepted in disparate treatment law as nondiscriminatory
explanations and justifications for an employer’s adverse
employment actions.
Although the domino effect has profound consequences, including
the glass ceiling, gender- and race-based job segregation, and
tokenism, courts are generally predisposed to attribute such stark
patterns of inequality to external factors, such as the gendered
division of family labor, minority groups’ lack of education, skills,
knowledge, or experience, and the absence of qualified, diverse
applicants. In this view, individual employees’ qualifications and
ability to perform their jobs preexist any interaction with the
workplace, and the employer is not responsible for shaping or even
responding to the disadvantages that result from discrimination.
My hypothetical focused primarily on individual disparate
treatment, retaliation, and harassment claims, because the great
majority of employment discrimination cases involve claims asserted
by individual plaintiffs. Although significant in number, these cases
do not usually attract as much publicity or attention as large class
actions or suits challenging affirmative action plans. However,
disparate treatment and other individual claims are of enormous
significance to addressing employment discrimination, even though
they do not receive as much attention, because they are the largest
part of the caseload.94
Finally, although there will of course be variation, it is important
to highlight that the domino effect illustrated in this hypothetical
will be experienced to a greater or lesser extent by any employee who
does not conform with the ideal-worker norm. This would include, for
93. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process: Toward an
Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment Quality for Caregiver, 2007 UTAH L. REV.
25, 32-33; Kessler, supra note 52, at 399 (“[C]ourts . . . have uniformly held that needs or
conditions of a child that require a mother’s presence are not within the scope of the PDA.”).
94. See sources cited supra note 30.
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example, gender-nonconforming men who do significant family
caregiving work; employees with serious illnesses or disabilities or
employees caring for others with serious illnesses or disabilities,
including children, elderly parents, extended family,95 and friends;96
and perhaps even single employees who are responsible for all of
their self-care.97 The domino effect is also likely to be set in motion by
culturally-grounded dress or grooming practices, as well as primary
language differences. Finally, the idea of the domino effect might even
be productively applied to understand the dynamics of simple statusbased discrimination, given that stereotyping and discrimination
often trigger adaptive responses by individuals that may negatively
influence their job-related choices, energy, or performance.
III. DOWNPLAYING THE DOMINO EFFECT: SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH AND TITLE VII
In this Part, in an effort to illustrate my larger point about
employment discrimination law’s inattention to the domino-like
dynamics of discrimination in the workplace, I review some of the
social science research exploring the reasons for women’s
compromised labor market position in the United States, as well as
the three basic proof structures for litigating employment
discrimination cases under Title VII. This analysis demonstrates that
a great deal of social science research on gender inequality in the
workplace, as well as all of Title VII’s major proof structures, tend to
ignore or downplay the interrelationships among individual employee
choices and characteristics, discriminatory bias, and structural
impediments to sex equality. The research I review focuses on the
particular problem of workplace gender discrimination. However, the
larger insights of this Part are equally applicable to other
disadvantaged identities, such as race and sexuality.
A. Social Science Research
Women’s compromised labor market position in the United States
has long drawn scholarly attention from many disciplines, including
economics, psychology, sociology, gender studies, social work, law,
business, and management studies. Three competing frameworks
95. See generally Peggie Smith, Elder Care, Work, and Gender: The Work-Family
Issue of the 21st Century, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 351 (2004).
96. See generally Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007).
97. See generally Adam Romero, Methodological Descriptions: “Feminist” and “Queer”
Legal Theories, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS,
UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS 179 (Martha Albertson Fineman, Jack E. Jackson & Adam
P. Romero eds., 2009); Martha T. McCluskey, Caring for Workers, 55 ME. L. REV. 313 (2002).
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have emerged for understanding gendered patterns of inequality in
the workplace: individuals’ personal choices or preferences, gender
bias, and structural barriers to equality attributable to the
organization of work itself. This Section summarizes these competing
explanations. It also explores some of the reasons researchers fail to
integrate them or explore their interrelationships, including the
tendency of scholars trained in different disciplines to adopt varying
conceptual frameworks.
1. Choice and Essential Difference
According to one body of research, gender-based workplace
inequity persists because women do not have the same ability and
motivation to achieve at work as men. Economists describe this in
terms of women’s lesser human capital,98 rational or “statistical”
discrimination,99 or the efficiency of sexual divisions of labor.100
Evolutionary biologists and psychologists explain gender inequity in
the workplace in terms of the basic structure of the brain and other
physiological phenomena. According to this framework, genetic or
hormonal differences could cause women to be less competitive or
ambitious at work than men.101 Courts and legal scholars adopting
these perspectives assert that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
unrelated to an employee’s sex—such as lack of availability for fulltime work, overtime, or work-related travel; unwillingness to
relocate; and risk aversion—explain sex-based inequality in the
workplace.102 These frameworks share the assumption that unequal
employment patterns like the glass ceiling, gender-wage gap, and sex
segregation are caused by the differences, limitations, choices, or
needs of female employees that are exogenous to the workplace.

98. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 43-44 (1991); June O’Neill &
Solomon Polachek, Why the Gender Gap in Wages Narrowed in the 1980s, 11 J. LAB. ECON.
205, 207 (1993); Alison J. Wellington, Changes in the Male/Female Wage Gap, 1976–85, 28
J. HUM. RESOURCES 383, 386 (1993).
99. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR
MARKETS 3-5 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973); Edmund S. Phelps, The
Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659, 659-661 (1972).
100. Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor, 3 J.
LAB. ECON. S33, S36-S39 (1985).
101. SUSAN PINKER, THE SEXUAL PARADOX: EXTREME MEN, GIFTED WOMEN, AND THE
REAL GENDER GAP 215-20 (2008); Stephen M. Colarelli et. al., Women, Power, and Sex
Composition in Small Groups: An Evolutionary Perspective, 27 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
163, 169 (2006).
102. See Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994); EEOC v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 348 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Stout v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 862 (5th Cir. 2002); Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination
and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 836-37, 850-51 (2001).
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Economists and other social scientists often refer to these theories as
“supply side” explanations.103
2. Bias
A second body of research identifies gender bias as a major
contributor to women’s workplace inequality. From this perspective,
stereotypes about women and employees with family responsibilities
cause employers to irrationally discriminate on the basis of sex and
gender. For example, decades of social science research has repeatedly
found that women face distinct social penalties for doing the very
things that are expected to lead to success in the workplace.104
Social science research also tells us that pregnant women and
mothers experience a uniquely hostile and pervasive form of gender
discrimination, regardless of qualifications or job performance.105 For
example, in laboratory experiments, pregnant applicants are more
likely to be assessed as lazy, complainers, and moody compared with
non-pregnant applicants, especially when applying for stereotypically
male jobs.106 Similarly, in investigations of discrimination against
mothers in the laboratory and the labor market, equally qualified
and credentialed women job applicants with children are rated as
less competent; less committed; less suitable for hire, promotion, and
training; and deserving of lower salaries compared with women
applicants who are not parents.107 Research also finds that mothers
103. See Reskin, supra note 21, at 248.
104. Madeline E. Heilman, Gender Stereotypes and Workplace Bias, 32 RES.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 113 passim (2012) (discussing the perceived lack of fit between
the attributes expected to succeed in high-level organizational positions—such as being
ambitious, task-focused, assertive, decisive, self-reliant, analytical, logical, and objective—
and the expected attributes of women—being kind, caring, considerate, warm, friendly,
collaborative, obedient, respectful, and intuitive); Julie E. Phelan & Laurie A. Rudman,
Prejudice Toward Female Leaders: Backlash Effects and Women’s Impression Management
Dilemma, 4 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS, 807 passim (2010) (reviewing research demonstrating the double bind that female leaders face in the workplace, in that that
they are required to display agency to overcome the lack of fit between their gender and leadership, yet when they do so, they risk hiring discrimination and prejudice).
105. See Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Shelly J. Correll, Motherhood as a Status Characteristic,
60 J. SOC. ISSUES 683, 697 (2004) (“The biased evaluations and behavioral responses elicited
by the status of the mother role are similar in type to those elicited by the status associated
with sex itself. But, by our account, the biases evoked by the mother role will be more strongly discriminatory in most workplace settings than those produced by sex status alone because
motherhood is seen as more directly indicative of workplace performance than is sex.”).
106. Michelle R. Hebl et al., Hostile and Benevolent Reactions Toward Pregnant Women:
Complimentary Interpersonal Punishments and Rewards that Maintain Traditional Roles,
92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1499, 1508-10 (2007).
107. See, e.g., Shelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is There a
Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1297, 1298 (2007). In the laboratory portion of this
study, participants evaluated a pair of simulated job applicants who differed only on
parental status. Id. at 1309. The researchers then submitted similar applications to real
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face discrimination in work evaluations, even when there is
indisputable evidence that they are competent and committed to paid
work.108 These findings are consistent with studies finding that
working women who become mothers “trade perceived competence for
perceived warmth.”109
Working men who become fathers do not make this trade.110
Moreover, when it comes to wages, male employees are not generally
penalized, and in fact often experience a wage premium, for being
married or a parent.111 However, there is some evidence of a
threshold effect for men; men who cross the gender line by taking a
family leave, for example, suffer many of the same biases that
working mothers do.112 For example, in experimental studies, men
who were depicted as taking parental leave were less likely to be
recommended for work rewards, such as admission to a fast-track
executive training program, promotions, salary increases, and the
assignment of high-profile projects.113 Indeed, evidence from human
resources suggests that fathers who request flexible work
arrangements or go part-time may actually experience greater
workplace hostility than mothers who do.114
job openings. Id. at 1327-28. The results closely corresponded to those in the laboratory;
mothers were called back for interviews about half as often as nonmothers. Id. at 1330.
108. Stephen Benard & Shelley J. Correll, Normative Discrimination and the
Motherhood Penalty, 24 GENDER & SOC’Y 616, 639 (2010).
109. Amy J.C. Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn’t Cut
the Ice, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 701, 701-05 (2004).
110. Id.; see also Kathleen Fuegen et al., Mothers and Fathers in the Workplace: How
Gender and Parental Status Influence Judgments of Job-Related Competence, 60 J. SOC.
ISSUES 737, 737-39, 748 (2004).
111. Joni Hersch & Leslie S. Stratton, Household Specialization and the Male Marriage
Wage Premium, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 78, 93 (2000) (finding a wage premium for
married men as compared with unmarried men that is not explained by time spent on
domestic tasks); Melissa J. Hodges & Michelle J. Budig, Who Gets the Daddy Bonus?
Organizational Hegemonic Masculinity and the Impact of Fatherhood on Earnings, 24
GENDER & SOC’Y 717, 740-41 (2010) (finding that the earnings bonus for fatherhood
persists after controlling for an array of differences, including human capital, labor supply,
family structure, and wives’ employment status, and that married white men with high
socioeconomic status receive the largest fatherhood earnings bonus); see also Rebecca
Glauber, Race and Gender in Families and at Work: The Fatherhood Wage Premium, 22
GENDER & SOC’Y 8, 24-25 (2008) (finding that a positive wage differential for fatherhood
persists for married men even after controlling for a host of other relevant factors that
include human capital, work hours, and effort, but that black men receive a smaller
premium for fatherhood).
112. Tammy D. Allen & Joyce E. A. Russell, Parental Leave of Absence: Some Not So
Family-Friendly Implications, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 166, 185 (1999).
113. Id. at 174, 179 & tbl.2, 185.
114. Alice H. Eagly & Valerie J. Steffen, Gender Stereotypes, Occupational Roles, and
Beliefs About Part-Time Employees, PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q., Sept. 1986, at 252, 252-61; Joan
C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who
Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 101-02 (2003).

2017]

THE DOMINO EFFECT

1077

Overall, researchers adopting this perspective focus on irrational
gender bias as the primary generator of workplace inequality for
women and employees with family responsibilities.115
3. Structural Explanations
A third body of social science research locates a major cause of
gender inequality at work in the mismatch between the needs of
employees with family responsibilities and the institutional structure
of work.116 According to this research, cultural norms and
expectations about the ideal worker who has an adult family member
at home on a full-time basis who can take care of family and home
responsibilities do not reflect the reality of today’s employees.117
These researchers note that most families are no longer structured
around the full-time breadwinner and full-time homemaker ideal.118
Yet the workplace and other societal institutions have not kept up
with the reality of modern families.119 Researchers adopting this
perspective largely frame women’s workplace inequality as a problem
arising from the gendered structure of work. Lawyers and activists
advocating family-friendly workplace policies have drawn on this

115. See, e.g., JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN
93 (2010).
116. Id. at 43-44.
117. Id.
118. As of 2006, sixty-two percent of married-couple families had two earners, while
only twenty-four percent depended solely on a husband’s income. Stella Potter Cromartie,
Labor Force Status of Families: A Visual Essay, MONTHLY LAB. REV., July/Aug. 2007, at 35,
38. In addition, single-parent homes, overwhelmingly headed by women, claim a growing
proportion of American households. In 2012, twenty-eight percent of all American children
lived with only one parent. JONATHAN VESPA ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S
FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2012, at 23 (2013), https://www.census.gov/prod/
2013pubs/p20-570.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GXD-6CES].
119. Notably, this situation applies equally to women and men; most workplaces are
still dominated by the assumption that employees do not have any outside obligations.
Thus, although, for example, many men in professional occupations express an ideological
commitment to an equal division of household labor with their intimate partners, few are
able to achieve it, except perhaps a very small number of exhausted “superdads.” Marianne
Cooper, Being the “Go-To Guy”: Fatherhood, Masculinity, and the Organization of Work in
Silicon Valley, 23 QUALITATIVE SOC. 379, 391 (2000). Gender-nonconforming men who seek
time-off or other types of accommodations in order to perform family caregiving work are
often punished just as mothers are. WILLIAMS, supra note 115, at 56-60 (2010); Allen &
Russell, supra note 112, at 166-68; Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Paternal Leave, 72 TEX.
L. REV. 1047, 1049 (1994); Michael Selmi, Sex Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies
Style: Case Studies in the Preservation of Male Workplace Norms, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y
J. 1, 3 (2005); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation,
and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 839-44 (2003); Sturm, supra
note 42, at 459-61.
AND CLASS MATTER
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“demand side” theory. Although progress is uneven, this strategy has
resulted in some positive trends in judicial and policy decisions.120
4. Competing Disciplinary Frameworks
These divergent accounts of the reasons for gender-based worker
inequality can be explained, in part, by the distinct conceptual
frameworks employed by scholars trained in different disciplines. For
example, mainstream economics continues, to a certain extent, to
distinguish between those who engage in productive labor and those
who do not, with productive labor implicitly defined as goods or
services exchanged in a market.121 Childrearing, cooking, cleaning,
and domestic labor more generally are not productive in this view.122
Mainstream economics’ focus on markets thus excludes, by definition,
unpaid domestic labor and renders it irrelevant to analyses of the
workplace.123 Mainstream economics is also more likely to
conceptualize employees as self-interested individuals who make
decisions based on the rational pursuit of self-interest. This
analytical framework tends to confirm supply side theories of gender
inequity, locating the “problem” of gender-based workplace inequality
outside the workplace.124
In contrast, sociological theories of workplace gender inequality
emphasize structural forces and cultural influences. Although there
is no single definition, structural factors are typically understood as a

120. Among the successes are the federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, a
2007 EEOC enforcement guidance on Family Responsibilities Discrimination (also known
as caregiver discrimination), and paid family leave laws in a handful of jurisdictions—
California, Rhode Island, Washington, New Jersey, and New York and the District of
Columbia. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611-2619 (2012);
Paid Family Leave, CAL. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. CODE § 3300 (West 2013); D.C. MUN. REGS.
tit. 6-B, § 1284 (2017); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 12:21-1.1 (2017); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 12, §§ 355-364 (2017); 42-5 R.I. Code R. § 2:2 (2017); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-130-030
(2017); Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with
Caregiving Responsibilities, EEOC (2007), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html
[https://perma.cc/9XAZ-Y9HG].
121. Nancy Folbre, The Unproductive Housewife: Her Evolution in Nineteenth-Century
Economic Thought, SIGNS, Spring 1991, at 463-69; Joan Williams, Market Work and
Family Work in the 21st Century, 44 VILL. L. REV. 305, 312, 321 (1999).
122. Folbre, supra note 121, at 464-69.
123. Id. at 463-66.
124. Feminist economists have challenged the assumptions of mainstream economics
through attention to institutional practices, laws and regulations, and systemic power
relations. See, e.g., BARBARA R. BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 62-86
(1986); Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 AM. SOC.
REV. 204, 204-05 (2001); Folbre, supra note 121, at 463-65; Jane Waldfogel, Understanding the
“Family Gap” in Pay for Women with Children, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 137, 149-53 (1998).
However, mainstream economics and public policy continue to marginalize these perspectives.
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range of material, objective constraints external to individuals.125
Cultural theories of work and family conflict examine external
expectations that shape paid and unpaid work. For example,
researchers have shown how an intensive parenting culture
contributes to some women’s decisions to abandon paid employment,
in addition to other negative effects.126 Similarly, sociologists of work
have revealed how workplace culture may present a barrier to
reforms that improve work-life balance. For example, a
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) study found that
surgical residents actually resisted a reduction of working hours,
because long hours are a part of their professional identity.127
Given the divergent premises and commitments of researchers
across social science disciplines, the three prevailing understandings
of gender-based worker inequality—individual employee “supply
side” factors, gender stereotyping, and the mismatch between the
structure of work and the needs of employees with family
responsibilities—are often presented as distinctive, even rival,
theoretical frameworks. As such, a great deal of social science
research involves unsatisfying efforts to identify the “real” cause of
systemic patterns of gender inequality in the workplace or, at best,
the relative contribution of each. For example, economic research on
the motherhood wage gap has focused on quantifying the relative
contribution of supply side human capital factors, such as years of
work experience, and discrimination by employers.128 Socio-legal
scholars interested in progressive workplace reform have also
dedicated significant energy to disproving economic supply side
theories of workplace gender inequality by emphasizing how
workplace structures and stereotyping contribute to work and family
conflict.129

125. DAVID RUBINSTEIN, CULTURE, STRUCTURE, AND AGENCY: TOWARD A TRULY
MULTIDIMENSIONAL SOCIOLOGY 1-6 (2001); Sharon Hays, Structure and Agency and the
Sticky Problem of Culture, 12 SOC. THEORY 57, 57-72 (1994).
126. See Gaia Bernstein & Zvi Triger, Over-Parenting, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1273
(2011); see also MARY BLAIR-LOY, COMPETING DEVOTIONS: CAREER AND FAMILY AMONG
WOMEN EXECUTIVES 74-82 (2003); SUSAN J. DOUGLAS & MEREDITH W. MICHAELS, THE
MOMMY MYTH: THE IDEALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD AND HOW IT HAS UNDERMINED WOMEN
passim (2004); JUDITH WARNER, PERFECT MADNESS: MOTHERHOOD IN THE AGE OF ANXIETY
115-21, 140-43 (2005); Gill Valentine, ‘My Son’s a Bit Dizzy.’ ‘My Wife’s a Bit Soft’: Gender,
Children and Cultures of Parenting, 4 GENDER, PLACE & CULTURE 37, 47-49 (1997).
127. See Katherine C. Kellogg et al., Resistance to Change in Surgical Residency: An
Ethnographic Study of Work Hours Reform, 202 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 630, 633 (2006).
128. See Budig & England, supra note 124, at 210-11.
129. See Kessler, supra note 44, at 322-30; Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of
Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the
“Clueless” Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401 passim (2003).
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B. Title VII
Like a great deal of social science research, Title VII’s major
theories of liability also, almost uniformly, assume that the three
prevailing frameworks for understanding gender-based worker
inequality operate independently of one another.
1. Disparate Treatment
Under prevailing Title VII disparate treatment law,130 courts must
decide sex discrimination claims on the basis of evidence that an
employer acted because of gender bias or a “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason” related to the employee’s qualifications or
work performance.131 In the alternative, under a mixed-motive
theory, a court can find liability if gender bias was a motivating
factor.132 Both of these prevailing theories of disparate treatment
assume that individual employee characteristics, gender bias, and
workplace structures operate mutually exclusively of one another in
the workplace. In this sense, the domino effect remains unaddressed
by disparate treatment law.
The disparate treatment case, Warner v. Vance-Cooks,133
illustrates this failure. Kimberly Warner sued her employer, the
federal Government Printing Office (GPO), alleging that it had
discriminated against her on the basis of her sex.134 She was
represented by the Georgetown University Institute for Public
Representation,135 a public interest law firm and clinical education
program founded by Georgetown Law Center.136 Warner began her
employment with the GPO in 1989 as a payroll technician. She did
not have a college degree.137 She successfully worked her way up to
130. Title VII is the basic federal statute prohibiting discrimination in employment.
Title VII disparate treatment claims can be brought if an employer treats male and female
applicants or workers differently. The law has been interpreted to prohibit disparate
treatment on the basis of sex “plus” a facially neutral characteristic, such as having young
children. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971). In addition, Title
VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
131. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Krieger, supra note 41, at 1178.
132. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989); Krieger, supra note 41, at 1172.
133. 956 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D.D.C. 2013).
134. Id. at 136.
135. Id.; see also GEO. L. INST. FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION, 2007-2008 ANNUAL REPORT
6, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/clinical-programs/ourclinics/IPR/upload/2007-2008ANNUALREPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9CM-LHNZ].
136. See Institute for Public Representation, GEO. L., http://www.law.georgetown.edu/
academics/academic-programs/clinical-programs/our-clinics/IPR/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/
4PRH-4RAK].
137. Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d 129, at 137. There is some suggestion that Warner was a
racial minority, as the court’s decision repeatedly refers to race discrimination. However, her
complaint did not allege race discrimination and none of her pleadings referenced her race.
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become a graphic processor supervisor, and ultimately, the Chief of
the GPO’s Digital Print Center (DPC) in 2005.138 In this position, she
was “in charge of scheduling, assigning work to, training, evaluating,
and monitoring employees across three shifts” and “serve[d] as the
selecting official for all vacancies within the DPC.”139 Her job
required “expert knowledge in highly technical machinery,
computers, and software applications; GPO and DPC procedures,
work standards, and workflow; and GPO personnel policies,
functions, and operations.”140 In 2001, Warner assumed the
responsibilities as head of the DPC when her former supervisor was
promoted, but she was not formally promoted into his vacant
position.141 She filed an EEOC complaint alleging that she was being
paid significantly less than the supervisor she replaced.142 As a result
of this complaint, Warner received a formal promotion and pay
increase in 2005 and a lump sum monetary settlement in 2007.143
Subsequently, Warner applied for seven positions at a higher pay
grade. The GPO placed her on the “best qualified list” for each
position; however, management invited her to interview for only one
of the positions and hired men for all but one.144 She eventually sued
for not being promoted to one of these positions. The man who
received the position had been given the opportunity to fill-in
temporarily in the job for three months, allowing him to gain relevant
experience in the position and thereby demonstrate his qualifications
before he was selected over Warner for the promotion.145
In addition to differential opportunities to be groomed for
advancement, Warner alleged a number of retaliatory and
discriminatory conditions. A very loud binding machine unrelated to
the work of her department was placed in her work area without her
input.146 The noise created obstacles to her performing her work,
which involved dealing with customers and vendors over the
telephone and serving walk-up customers.147 She was denied a
private office, despite multiple requests. Dealing with confidential
138. Id.
139. Id. at 138.
140. Id.
141. See Complaint at 2, Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:10-cv01306), ECF No. 1.
142. Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d 129, at 138.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 141.
145. Id.
146. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:10-cv01306), ECF No. 24-1, at 36-37.
147. Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d 129, at 142.
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supervisory matters was also difficult given the public location of her
workspace.148 All of the other supervisors in the DPC, who were men,
had private offices,149 as did many assistant supervisors below her.150
Her budget was cut, and the resulting understaffing required her to
undertake non-supervisory printing responsibilities.151 Warner was
denied cross-training opportunities, despite repeated requests.152
She asserted that she was given the title of supervisor but was not
treated as one.153 For example, male subordinates without experience
were assigned to take over her duties, undermining her authority.154
She was left out of meetings where important decisions were made,155
such as the closure of one of the DPC’s offices and the termination of
an employee she supervised.156 On one occasion, when she did attend
a management meeting, another manager engaged in a tirade
against Warner.157 Subsequent to this incident of verbal abuse,
Warner stopped attending management meetings altogether, because
she did not feel comfortable.158
The GPO used a performance-based evaluation system.159 Warner
had consistently received the highest possible ratings on her
evaluations before she settled her EEOC pay complaint in 2007.160
Subsequently, she received her lowest ratings of her near twentyyear DPC career.161 Although her performance evaluations were still
very good, she never received the highest possible rating again.162
Warner argued that all of the conditions, as a whole, combined with
the biased performance ratings, constituted retaliation for her EEOC
complaint and discrimination on the basis of sex.163 She alleged that
the discrimination caused her to lose sleep and suffer from
depression, and that for almost a year, she was not able to get out of

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 146, at 37.
151. Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 143.
152. Id. at 145.
153. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 146, ECF No. 24-2, at 2-4.
154. Id.
155. Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 145-46.
156. Id. at 146.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 143-44.
160. Id. at 139.
161. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 146, ECF No. 24, at 10 & ECF No. 24-1, at 10.
162. Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 143-45.
163. Id. at 147-48.
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bed when not at work, which diminished her ability as a single
parent to care for her teenage son.164
Warner also introduced two other types of evidence: direct
evidence of sex discrimination and statistical evidence. Specifically,
she presented evidence that the person who made the decision to
promote a man rather than Warner had once told her she would just
have to “suck it up because that’s how it is with women in the plant”;
and that she “would have to work extra hard [to get ahead] and deal
with it.”165 She also introduced statistical evidence demonstrating a
classic glass-ceiling pattern of sex discrimination, with only twelve
percent of the GPO’s top management consisting of women, despite
the fact that more than half of the GPO’s overall professional
workforce was female.166
Despite this mountain of evidence demonstrating sex
discrimination and retaliation, the district court granted summary
judgment on both claims in favor of the GPO.167 In doing so, it
reasoned that the man who received the promotion rather than
Warner was more qualified, because he had more years of experience
and exposure in more departments.168 In making this assessment, the
court dismissed Warner’s evidence of irregularities in the GPO’s
decisionmaking process, as well as the fact that the successful
candidate was rated just a few points more than Warner in a
mathematical scoring system for the position. It also neglected to
acknowledge that the GPO’s own decision to groom the successful
candidate for a promotion, deny her cross-training opportunities,169
and shut out Warner from leadership contributed to his higher score.
The court also diminished all of Warner’s other evidence. It reasoned
that the “suck it up” comment was a stray remark unrelated to the
decisional process not to promote her;170 that the statistical evidence
was not probative of discrimination, because it did not include an
164. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment, supra note 146, ECF No. 24, at 10 & ECF No. 24-1, at 55-63.
165. Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 156; see also Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 146, ECF
No. 24, at 10 & ECF No. 24-1, at 10-11.
166. Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 138.
167. Id. at 137.
168. Id. at 153-54.
169. Vicki Schultz’s observations on the matter of differential training, articulated
almost twenty years ago, are as pertinent as ever. She explained, “In nontraditional bluecollar occupations, virtually all training is acquired informally on the job. Thus, a woman's
ability to succeed depends on the willingness of her supervisors and coworkers to teach her
the relevant skills. Yet women’s stories of being denied proper training are legion.” See
Schultz, supra note 73, at 1835.
170. Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 155-56.
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analysis of applicant flow data;171 that the allegedly biased
performance evaluations did not constitute adverse employment
actions, because they were still very good;172 and that Warner’s other
evidence, such as her exclusion from important meetings and
committees and lack of an office, were minor annoyances that did not
amount to an adverse employment action.173 The court concluded its
opinion by observing that Warner was a “dissatisfied, frustrated and
unhappy” employee “for years,”174 language suggesting that the court
saw no relation between the discrimination Warner endured and its
impact on her.
This type of judicial response to a quite representative individual
disparate treatment case illustrates the inadequacy of Title VII as
presently conceptualized to address the domino effect. The court
disaggregated the evidence into a series of seemingly isolated and
trivial incidents and neglected to consider how the plaintiff’s
behaviors, such as absenting herself from meetings and filing
grievances, represented rational and legitimate responses to the
pervasive pattern of sex discrimination. It also failed to credit how
the many forms of discrimination she suffered negatively affected her
qualifications, which then ultimately became the justification for the
decision not to promote her.
Inequality often results from the amalgamation of a series of
discriminatory acts that combine to result in substantial inequalities.
Moreover, discrimination and biased evaluation often impede
employees’ ability to succeed at work, both by hindering employees’
ability to perform their jobs and by signaling that little investment
should be made in protected employees’ successes. Further, in the
face of discrimination, employees often engage in compensatory
behaviors, such as avoidance, which may make them appear
uncommitted or compromise their ability to do their jobs.
Discrimination may also have adverse mental or physical health
effects, which further diminish employee performance. As the
Warner case illustrates, these dynamics do not occur at one
particular moment or in a straight line. Rather, discrimination often
results from a chain of events that build and combine in ways that
cause significant inequality, through a process of social interaction
and reinforcement. If the process of employment discrimination were
to be represented graphically, it would be a circle, not a line.
Title VII disparate treatment doctrine, as presently conceptualized,
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 159.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 174.
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is unable to provide a remedy for this common social process of
discriminatory exclusion.
2. Systemic Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact
Although disparate treatment is the main focus of this Article, it
is worth noting that the systemic disparate treatment175 and
disparate impact176 theories of discrimination under Title VII, while
better able to capture the ways that systemic bias and discriminatory
workplace structures may perpetuate inequality for employees, also
generally fail to account for the dynamic interdependent nature of
individual employee “choices,” discriminatory bias, and workplace
structures.
For example, disparate impact has been used with relatively
limited success in challenging structural features of workplaces that
exacerbate gender-based inequality, such as long or inflexible work
hours, limited sick or personal leave, extended probationary periods,
layoff policies that disfavor part-time employees, travel
requirements,177 and restrictive light-duty policies.178 More generally,
the Supreme Court’s disparate impact decisions have gradually
increased the plaintiff's burden of proof in disparate impact cases;
neutrality of impact is now measured according to the specific
employment criteria, rather than the broader discernable impact on
the employer’s workforce. Under this standard, plaintiffs must isolate
and identify each discriminatory practice and its mechanism of
action; plaintiffs cannot just identify the consequences in the form of
statistical disparities in an employer’s workforce and expect the

175. The Title VII systemic disparate treatment theory is used in cases where a
widespread pattern or practice of intentional discrimination is proved using statistical evidence
in addition to other types of evidence, such as anecdotal evidence of individual instances of
discrimination. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977).
176. The Title VII disparate impact theory is used in cases where practices or policies
that appear to be gender neutral actually have a negative impact on workers of one sex. In
a disparate impact case, a plaintiff need not prove that the employer acted with discriminatory purpose or intent. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff need only show that apparently neutral selection criteria operated to exclude protected class members at a disproportionate rate. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989). The employer
bears the burden of justifying the challenged criteria. The employer’s burden is merely one
of “producing evidence of a business justification for his employment practice[s].” Wards
Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 659 (1989).
177. See Kessler, supra note 52, at 414-15.
178. See Widiss, supra note 51, at 1020-21 (noting that pregnant employees who have
challenged restrictive light-duty policies under the disparate impact theory have often been
unsuccessful).
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employer to explain the practice on business grounds.179 Moreover,
plaintiffs can no longer rely on the proportion of minorities in the
general population as a baseline for measuring disparate impact.
Instead, plaintiffs must calculate the racial composition of “the
qualified . . . population in the relevant labor market.”180 Both of
these limitations essentially erase the structural aspects of
employment discrimination by disaggregating into isolated events
systemic employment practices that produce inequality.181 More
generally, a majority of the Supreme Court has signaled its general
hostility to the disparate impact theory across contexts.182
Additionally, under both the systemic disparate treatment183 and
disparate impact184 frameworks, courts have allowed employers to
avoid liability for discrimination by arguing that employees protected
by Title VII lack interest in highly rewarded jobs.185 In doing so,
courts have failed to recognize the role of workplace structures and
179. Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 657; Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487
U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (plurality opinion).
180. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977).
181. See, e.g., Vitug v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 88 F.3d 506, 515-16 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that word-of-mouth recruitment practices resulting in the disproportionate failure
to hire Asian or Catholic applicants did not demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination, because the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that any particular employment
qualification produced a statistical disparity); cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S.
338, 352 (2011) (holding that statistical evidence of gender disparities combined with a
sociologist’s analysis that Wal-Mart’s corporate culture made it vulnerable to gender bias
were inadequate to show that members of the putative class had a common claim for purposes of class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)).
182. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015) (disallowing disparate impact claims where a plaintiff cannot establish a “robust” causal link to a defendant’s actual policies serves to eliminate suits seeking
to hold a defendant liable for alleged racial disparities it “did not create.”); cf. Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579-80 (2009) (holding that the City of New Haven’s decision to
invalidate the results of a promotional exam for firefighters in order to avoid disparate
impact of the test on black and Hispanic candidates constituted illegal disparate treatment
in violation of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, because the City had considered
the racial impact of the test in abandoning the results).
183. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
184. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 647, 653-54 (holding that in a
racially-segregated Alaska salmon cannery, the cannery workforce of mostly Filipinos and
Alaska Natives was not the relevant labor market for better-paid, unskilled non-cannery
jobs, because the cannery workers did not seek these positions, despite evidence that the
employer relied on racially segregated hiring channels, operated segregated housing and
dining facilities, and used a number of other employment practices, such as adopting a
rehiring preference and not promoting from within, that could explain its segregated
workforce at the plant). But see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (rejecting a
state’s argument that disparate impact should only be assessed with regard to women who
actually applied for prison guard jobs and that a weight and height requirement for such
jobs did not have a disparate impact on the women who actually applied).
185. Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical
Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1080-81 (1992).
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gender and race bias in shaping applicants and employees’ career
aspirations. More recently, the Supreme Court made it more difficult
to certify class actions under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,186 a crucial tool for large-scale litigation seeking structural
reform of the workplace, and in doing so, implicitly rejected the
systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of
employer liability under Title VII.187 Although these more expansive
theories of employer liability represent an improvement on the
individual disparate treatment framework in their recognition that
discrimination in the workplace is connected to larger social patterns,
neither doctrine, as presently constituted, provides an adequate
account of how workplaces themselves participate in social patterns
of discrimination and shape the employees subject to them.188
IV. DISCOVERING THE DOMINO EFFECT: ITS INTELLECTUAL AND
EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS
The imperative of lawyers to fit their clients’ facts into existing
doctrinal forms, as well as the natural pull of divergent disciplinary
perspectives on discrimination, have had unfortunate intellectual
consequences. Although few contributors to the fields of employment
discrimination or inequality in the labor market personally subscribe
to the undertheorized conception of inequality described in Part III,
much of the research, public-policy advocacy, and legal doctrine in
this area emphasizes the mutually exclusive nature of these theories.
An alternative social scientific perspective, considered in this Part,
examines interactions among the three potential understandings of
worker inequality. I discuss some of this research, which demonstrates
186. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 359 (2011). In Wal-Mart, the Court
narrowed the availability of class actions by its interpretation of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Rule 23(a)(2) requires a party seeking class
certification to prove that there are “questions of law or fact common to the class.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(a)(2). To satisfy Rule 23(a)(2), the lawsuit must resolve an issue that all the class
members share. In Wal-Mart, the issue underlying the claims of all members of the class
was whether Wal-Mart’s policy of granting local store managers complete and final discretion over pay and promotion decisions constituted a common discriminatory practice making all women employees vulnerable to sex discrimination. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 342. The
Court held that there was no common question of “law or fact,” as the statistical evidence
in the record showing pay and promotion disparities between male and female Wal-Mart
employees was insufficient to demonstrate a general corporate policy of allowing discrimination. Id. at 355. As a result, the class could not be certified because it could not meet the
requirements of Rule 23(a).
187. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 355.
188. See Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV.
2479, 2526 (1994) (“The reluctance of courts — across the range of Title VII doctrines — to
make explicit the ways that systems of discrimination operate and intersect, or shape the
consciousness of the subject, has created a doctrine that is blind to many discriminatory
dynamics.”).
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two dynamics relevant to this analysis. First, organizational
arrangements can activate or suppress bias. As such, discriminatory
workplace structures and stereotyping by decisionmakers are not
independent phenomena; rather, there is an interaction between the
two that can amplify or reduce discrimination and worker inequality.
Second, as should not be any surprise, employees who are subject to
bias are not immune from its affects. They may respond in ways
consistent with stereotypical expectations, or they may work to
overcome the stereotype by engaging in energy-expending behaviors
and strategies to counteract biased expectations. Either way, these
responses often produce real costs for the employee, for example, in the
form of lowered job productivity, diminished performance, or
dampened aspirations. Thus, taking account of these dynamics,
discriminatory bias and personal explanations for worker inequality—
such as individual employees’ characteristics, motivation,
performance, and personal “choices” (that is, factors disparate
treatment law classifies as belonging on the supply side of things)—are
also not independent of one another. As a whole, the research
discussed in this Part demonstrates the domino model of workplace
inequality, and it suggests that employers are substantially more
complicit in creating inequality than our current law assumes. Indeed,
work organizations can be veritable inequality factories under certain
conditions.
A. New Institutionalism
New institutionalism is a theory that focuses on developing a
sociological view of institutions. New institutionalism cannot be
simply defined—it has flourished in many disciplines including
sociology, economics, political science, business organization theory,
and history. As two key founders of this intellectual movement
explain, “approaches to institutions rooted in such different soils
cannot be expected to converge on a single set of assumptions and
goals,”189 but it is fair to say that the common thread is a “skepticism
toward atomistic accounts of social processes” and institutional
arrangements.190
One sub-genre of this research studies how inequality is produced
inside institutions and, in particular, how personnel practices in
189. See THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 3 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991) (anthology providing a thorough introduction to the field
of new institutionalism).
190. Id.; see also Robert L. Nelson, Ellen C. Berrey & Laura Beth Nielsen, Divergent
Paths: Conflicting Conceptions of Employment Discrimination in Law and the Social Sciences, 4 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 103, 112-15 (2008) (discussing new institutionalism research and its implications for employment discrimination law).
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work organizations shape employee preferences and behaviors.191
This research suggests that gendered work patterns, such as the
glass ceiling and sex-segregation, are traceable to the influence of
organizational structures on employees’ aspirations and behavior.
That is, work preferences and commitments evolve in the context of
the workplace environment and develop as a result of opportunities
and experiences. As legal scholar Vicki Schultz has noted, “these
observations seem astonishingly simple. It seems obvious that
socialization does not grind to a halt when young women emerge
from childhood, but continues behind the office door or factory gate to
influence their attitudes and aspirations as adult workers.”192 As
sociologist Rosabeth Moss Kanter explained in her classic account of
how organizations affect employee’s performance:
[T]o a very large degree, organizations make their workers into
who they are. Adults change to fit the system. . . . [O]rganizations
often act as though it is possible to predict people’s job futures
from the characteristics they bring with them [to] a recruiting
interview. What really happens is that predictions get made on the
basis of stereotypes and current notions of who fits where in the
present system; people are then “set up” in positions which make
the predictions come true.193

This theory should not be understood to assume that individuals
are automatons without agency. It is simply a recognition that people
act strategically within the constraints of their positions in an
organization. This insight is consistent with a significant body of
feminist scholarship challenging liberal conceptions of autonomy. For
example, feminist theorists have offered a number of insights about
how women’s choices are made under conditions of constraint that
may affect choices in a wide range of arenas, including decisions
about where to work, walk, and whether and how to speak.194
B. Stereotype Threat and the Self-Fulfilling Prophesy
Social psychologists have demonstrated how the situational threat
of being judged or treated stereotypically can affect the members of a
group about whom a negative stereotype exists, adversely affecting
191.
192.
193.
194.

Schultz, supra note 73, at 1815-32.
Id. at 1824.
ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 263 (1977).
See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF
DEPENDENCY 40-41 (2004); DIANA T. MEYERS, SELF, SOCIETY, AND PERSONAL CHOICE 14170 (1989). See generally Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in
Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995); Fineman, supra note 63; Katherine
M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 739-40 (1997)
(describing sexual harassment as a disciplinary practice).
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performance and hampering achievement.195 When individuals feel
that a sociocultural group to which they belong is negatively
stereotyped in that domain, performance can be hindered. Thus, for
example, in Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson’s seminal
experiments on stereotype threat, African-American students, who
are stereotyped to be poor students, underperformed relative to white
students when they were told that a test was diagnostic of how smart
they are.196 In the experiment, the investigators gave a difficult
verbal test to white and black college students. One group was told
that the test measured how smart they were. Another comparable
group was told that the same test was just a laboratory exercise. The
black students performed as well as the white students when they
were told the test was a general lab exercise, controlling for the
participants’ skills. In contrast, when told that the test was
measuring their intelligence, the black students greatly
underperformed equally skilled white students.197
The stereotype threat results have been replicated in experiments
involving other identities. For example, in a more recent study,
Asian-American women at Harvard University were asked to take a
hard math test. Those given a questionnaire before the test with
innocuous questions designed to prime their Asian identities
performed best, those given a questionnaire with no identity primed
came in second, and the group that had its female identity primed
ranked last (forty-three percent) on the test.198 These findings were
replicated by Steele and his team at the University of Michigan.
Women and men undergraduates with entering math SAT scores in
the top fifteen percent of the Michigan student population and who
identified math as “very important to their personal and career
goals” were given a difficult math test.199 The female students
performed just as well as the male students when the test was
presented as one that did not show sex differences, that is, as a test
in which women always did as well as men,200 but they performed
significantly worse than the male students when they did not receive
195. See generally Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape
Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613 (1997). Vicki Schultz
covered some of this ground more briefly in her article, Taking Discrimination Seriously,
91 DENV. L. REV. 995, 1007-08 (2015). I thank her for the foundational insights on which
this discussion is based.
196. See Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 808 (1995).
197. See id.
198. See Margaret Shih et al., Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in
Quantitative Performance, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 80, 80-81 (1999).
199. Claude M. Steele et al., Contending with Group Image: The Psychology of Stereotype
and Social Identity Threat, 34 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 379, 380 (2002).
200. Id. at 381.
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this instruction.201 Along the same lines, elderly people perform worse
on a memory task if they are primed before the task with a negative
stereotype of the elderly than if they are primed with a positive
stereotype of the elderly.202 Even typically privileged groups can be
made to experience stereotype threat. For example, a study found
that white men performed more poorly on a math test when they
were told that their performance would be compared with that of
Asian-American men,203 and another found that whites performed
more poorly than African Americans on a motor task when it was
described to them as measuring their natural athletic ability.204
These studies and others explaining a wide range of performance
disparities demonstrate the powerful influence of stereotypes on
individual performance,205 even when subtly activated.206
What explains the stereotype threat effects found in these studies?
The primary mechanism is likely related to stress. One very
comprehensive review posits that activating negative stereotypes
about a person’s identity creates physiological stress, which directly
impairs the ability to process information and causes the person to
divert mental energy to monitoring performance and suppressing
negative thoughts and emotions.207 These mechanisms combine to
201. Id. at 381 fig.1.
202. See Becca Levy, Improving Memory in Old Age Through Implicit Self-Stereotyping,
71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1092, 1092-101 (1996).
203. See Joshua Aronson et al., When White Men Can’t Do Math: Necessary and Sufficient Factors in Stereotype Threat, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 29, 33-34 (1999).
204. See Jeff Stone et al., Stereotype Threat Effects on Black and White Athletic Performance, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1213, 1223 (1999).
205. For additional studies, see Jean-Claude Croizet & Theresa Claire, Extending the
Concept of Stereotype and Threat to Social Class: The Intellectual Underperformance of
Students from Low Socioeconomic Backgrounds, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
588, 592-93 figs.1, 2 & 3 (1998) (finding that children with low socioeconomic status perform more poorly than do those with high socioeconomic status when instructions accompanying a test describe it as measuring intellectual ability, but not when the test is presented as nondiagnostic of intellectual ability); Jean-Claude Croizet et al., Stereotype
Threat Undermines Intellectual Performance by Triggering a Disruptive Mental Load, 30
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 721, 725 (2004) (finding that psychology students
perform more poorly than do science students when told a test measures mathematical and
logical reasoning); Patricia M. Gonzales et al., The Effects of Stereotype Threat and DoubleMinority Status on Test Performance of Latino Women, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 659, 667-68 (2002) (finding that when a task is described as diagnostic of intelligence, Latinos and particularly Latinas perform more poorly than do whites).
206. Research suggests that this process may be reversed. For example, social
psychologists have found that environmental factors, such as workplace diversity, may
diminish automatic stereotyping and that small changes in the context can produce
radically different responses by individuals to the same stimuli. See generally Irene V.
Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. REV. 242 (2002).
207. See Croizet & Claire, supra note 205, at 592-94; Toni Schmader et al., An Integrated
Process Model of Stereotype Threat Effects on Performance, 115 PSYCHOL. REV. 336, 352 (2008).
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consume mental resources needed to perform well on cognitive and
social tasks.
A related and fascinating phenomenon studied by social
psychologists is called the “self-fulfilling prophecy”208 or “behavioral
confirmation.”209 Behavioral confirmation occurs when stereotyping
or bias by a perceiver influences the perceiver’s treatment of a target,
which, in turn, shapes the target’s behavior in a manner consistent
with the perceiver’s expectancy.210 As explained by Robert Merton,
the Columbia University sociologist who developed the classic
definition of this theory, “[t]he self-fulling prophecy is, in the
beginning, a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior
which makes the originally false conception come true.”211 For
example, a person who holds a stereotype that black people are
hostile may behave cautiously and distrusting around a black
colleague, in accordance with her belief, and thereby evoke cold and
distant behavior from the colleague, confirming the stereotype.212
According to social psychologist Susan Fiske, “[b]eing able to make
the stereotype true can be convenient for the perceiver because it
makes the target predictable and potentially more controllable.”213
The behavioral confirmation then becomes the justification for future
treatment consistent with the originally false belief. In Merton’s
words, “The specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy
perpetuates a reign of error. For the prophet will cite the actual
course of events as proof that he was right from the very
beginning.”214
A number of controlled experiments illustrate the behavioral
confirmation phenomenon. When an African-American job candidate
is treated with great distance and abruptness, he flounders in an
interview.215 A child whose playmate believes she is younger chooses
easier games than a child labeled as older.216 The apparent reason is
that when one child believes her playmate is younger, she treats the
playmate as if she is a younger person, behaving in a more directive
and assertive manner, eliciting a response from the playmate that is
208. ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 129 (1957).
209. Mark Snyder, When Belief Creates Reality: The Self-Fulfilling Impact of First Impressions on Social Interaction, 18 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 247, 250-51
(1984).
210. See MERTON, supra note 208, at 422-26.
211. Id. at 423.
212. See id. at 250-57; Fiske, supra note 50, at 382.
213. See Fiske, supra note 50, at 382.
214. MERTON, supra note 208, at 423.
215. See Carl O. Word et al., The Nonverbal Mediation of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in
Interracial Interaction, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 109, 119-20 (1974).
216. See Lynn M. Musser & William G. Graziano, Behavioral Confirmation in Children’s Interactions with Peers, 12 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 441, 453 (1991).
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consistent with the play of a younger child.217 In an experiment
simulating police interrogations, mock crime suspects whose
interrogators are led to believe they are guilty are more likely to be
subject to aggressive interrogation techniques, which in turn evokes
more defensive responses by the suspects and leads judges naïve of
the experiment conditions to perceive the suspect as more guilty than
suspects whose interrogators believe they are innocent.218 In
simulated job interviews, applicants given the benefit of positive
expectations present more positive and less negative information
about themselves compared with applicants confronting interviewers
holding negative expectations,219 and female applicants whose male
interviewers are led to believe the female applicants are attracted to
them demonstrate significantly more flirtatious behavior than female
applicants whose interviewers do not hold this belief.220
With repeated exposure, the expectancy of being stereotyped can
become internalized and thus self-maintaining. As explained by
social psychologists Theresa Claire and Susan Fiske:
This is particularly true for certain categories of targets, often those
who are easily identified by noticeable physical characteristics. For
example, in this society, being African American, physically
disabled, or elderly often functions as a “master status” category.
Although the person belongs to other categories, perceivers from
majority groups accord extreme importance to this one salient
feature, and it influences both interpretations of the target’s
behavior and behavior toward the target. Thus, stereotypes
are . . . pervasively applied in interactions with targets.
From the target’s perspective, the pervasiveness of perceiver
stereotypes about one’s group means increased pressure to confirm
217. See id.
218. See Saul M. Kassin et al., Behavioral Confirmation in the Interrogation Room: On
the Dangers of Presuming Guilt, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 187, 199-200 (2003).
219. See Dylan M. Smith et al., Target Complicity in the Confirmation and Disconfirmation of Erroneous Perceiver Expectations: Immediate and Longer Term Implications, 73
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 974, 983 (1997).
220. See Robert D. Ridge & Jeffrey S. Reber, “I Think She’s Attracted to Me”: The Effect
of Men’s Beliefs on Women’s Behavior in a Job Interview Scenario, 24 BASIC & APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 11 (2002). For older studies finding similar results eliciting gendered
behavior, see Berna J. Skrypnek & Mark Snyder, On the Self-Perpetuating Nature of Stereotypes About Women and Men, 18 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 277, 288 (1982) (finding
that when a man expects a female coworker to enjoy stereotypically feminine tasks, after
talking to him, she is more likely to choose those very tasks when she and her colleagues
negotiate who will do what than when she responds to a man who does not embrace the
same sexist expectation); Mark Snyder, Elizabeth Decker Tanke & Ellen Berscheid, Social
Perception and Interpersonal Behavior: On the Self-Fulfilling Nature of Social Stereotypes,
35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 656, 663 (1977) (finding that a man talking on the
phone to a woman who he perceives to be unattractive does so with such detachment and
boredom that her responses in the conversation are also cool and uninterested).
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stereotypes because of the sheer number of times the target must
face the stereotypic conception.221

Thus, the targets of stereotyping may repeat behavior elicited
previously,222 “thereby making the stereotype ultimately, although
not initially, ‘true.’ ”223
In sum, when individuals hold expectations about other people (as
targets), they can elicit from these targets behaviors that are
consistent with their expectations, even if these expectations are
independent of the target’s preexisting characteristics. Research
suggests that behavioral confirmation is most likely to occur when a
perceiver has power over a dependent target,224 as is the case when
employers have power over job applicants or employees, making the
behavioral confirmation phenomenon particularly relevant to the
employment context.
Much of the research discovering the phenomenon of behavioral
confirmation is derived from controlled laboratory experiments. Of
course, work organizations are much more complex than the lab
setting, and behavioral confirmation sometimes occurs in ways
unanticipated by those who first advanced this sociological theory.
For example, targets who are aware of being stereotyped may
221. Theresa Claire & Susan T. Fiske, A Systemic View of Behavioral Confirmation:
Counterpoint to the Individualist View, in INTERGROUP COGNITION AND INTERGROUP
BEHAVIOR 210-11 (Constantine Sedikides et al. eds., 1998) (citations omitted). A “master
status” or “master category” refers to a deeply rooted categorization system people use to
organize social interaction. As explained by sociologists Cecilia Ridgway and Shelley Correll:
To interact successfully, people need at least some shared cultural systems for
categorizing and defining self and other in the situation so that they can anticipate each other’s behavior and act accordingly. Studies of social cognition suggest that a small number of these category systems, usually about two or three,
function as primary categories in a society. Primary categories describe things
that one must know about a person to render that person sufficiently meaningful that one can relate to her or him. . . . [E]vidence suggests that sex category
is always one of a society’s primary category systems—in the United States,
race is one as well.
Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Shelley J. Correll, Limiting Inequality Through Interaction: The
End(s) of Gender, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 110, 111 (2000).
222. See Russel H. Fazio et al., Self-Perceptions Following Social Interaction, 41 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 232, 239-40 (1981); Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr.,
Behavioral Confirmation in Social Interaction: From Social Perception to Social Reality, 14
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 148, 157-59 (1978).
223. Fiske, supra note 50, at 383; see also Smith et al., supra note 219, at 988 (finding
in a simulated employment interview, that applicants confronted by interviewers with low
expectations in a first interview offered more negative information about themselves and
did so as well in a second interview, even when the second interviewer was primed to have
high expectations of the applicant).
224. See Claire & Fiske, supra note 221, at 215-17; John T. Copeland, Prophesies of
Power: Motivational Implications of Social Power for Behavioral Confirmation, 67 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 264, 276 (1994).
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respond in ways that are incongruent with a perceiver’s stereotype to
counter erroneous and undesirable expectations,225 which has its own
costs and risks. However, hundreds of experimental studies over
several decades suggest that behavioral confirmation is a real
phenomenon that occurs in many domains.226
Field studies of the classroom, the workplace, and the military
correlate these findings outside the laboratory. For example, studies
have revealed that teachers’ low expectations of students depress
academic performance, and that this effect is larger for students who
are low in power and advantage.227 Along the same lines, middleschoolers whose peers have negative expectations of them become
increasingly submissive with friends over time,228 as any parent of a
bullied or ostracized child could anecdotally verify. A recent metaanalysis found that managers’ expectations have a self-fulfilling
effect, with higher expectations leading to higher employee
performance.229 Military trainees of whom instructors expect the least
perform the worst.230 In contrast, high expectations from military
225. See, e.g., Arthur A. Stukas, Jr. & Mark Snyder, Targets’ Awareness of Expectations
and Behavioral Confirmation in Ongoing Interactions, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
31, 39 (2002); cf. Mario P. Casa de Calvo & Darcy A. Reich, Spontaneous Correction in
the Behavioral Confirmation Process: The Role of Naturally-Occurring Variations in SelfRegulatory Resources, 29 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 351, 361-63 (2007) (finding that
both interviewer-perceivers and interviewee-targets were able to correct for false but extremely negative expectations of targets in simulated job interviews, but this correcting
behavior was more likely to occur when the parties were less tired and overworked). This
study helps make sense of the negative performance impacts of stereotype threat, whereby
additional mental energy is expended under conditions of being stereotyped. See supra note
207 and accompanying text; see also infra Section IV.D. (discussing Carbado and Gulati’s
theory of working identity, whereby minorities engage in “identity work” to combat negative stereotypes).
226. See Mark Snyder & Oliver Klein, Construing and Constructing Others on the Reality
and the Generality of the Behavioral Confirmation Scenario, 6 INTERACTION STUD. 53, 54 (2005).
227. See Rhona S. Weinstein et al., Intractable Self-Fulfilling Prophecies, Fifty Years
After Brown v. Board of Education, 59 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511, 512, 514 (2004) (summarizing field studies demonstrating the depressed academic performance of stigmatized minority students); Dennis Reynolds, Restraining Golem and Harnessing Pygmalion in the Classroom: A Laboratory Study of Managerial Expectations and Task Design, 6 ACAD. MGMT.
LEARNING & EDUC. 468, 481 (2007) (finding that even though randomly assigned, business
school undergraduate students assigned to sections whose teaching assistants were told
they had performed dismally on a pre-test and would expect to do poorly on a related upcoming tests, performed substantially worse on the related test than students whose teaching assistants did not hold negative expectations of performance).
228. See Emily Loeb et al., The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of Adolescent Social Expectations, 40 INT’L J. BEHAV. DEV. 555, 560-61 (2016).
229. See Nicole M. Kierien & Michael A. Gold, Pygmalion in Work Organizations: A
Meta-Analysis, 21 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 913, 923-26 (2000).
230. See Sasson Oz & Dov Eden, Restraining the Golem: Boosting Performance by
Changing the Interpretation of Low Scores, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 744, 750-51 (1994).
Note that for obvious ethical reasons, field studies inducing subjects to perform poorly are
uncommon. Id. at 744. Thus, in this study, military squad leaders’ perceptions were ma-
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commanders leads to increases in performance of cadets who are the
subject of these beliefs.231 These studies provide further support for
the claim that expectations of individuals can have dramatic effects
on their performance and that this phenomenon is likely to operate
the same way in work organizations as in the lab.
C. Salience
Salience is another helpful concept for understanding the domino
effect in the employment context. According to social scientists,
anything that focuses observers’ attention on a stereotyped category
is said to “prime” stereotyping, and this process occurs even without
the observer’s awareness.232 Employee behaviors or characteristics
associated with their minority status can trigger stereotyping by
others. For example, becoming pregnant, taking a family leave, or
simply having children tend to make an employee’s gender more
salient in the workplace, especially women’s.233 Wearing braids in the
workplace may make an African American’s race more salient,
creating a higher likelihood that she will be subject to negative
evaluation.234 In the context of the classroom, the concept of salience
explains why minority and women professors are more likely to be
negatively evaluated as politically biased by students when they
teach subjects that address identity and inequality.235 Organizational
nipulated to believe that low scores on a physical fitness test were not indicative of a subordinate’s ineptitude, whereas the control condition involved no manipulation. Id. at 74647. Trainees in the control condition made fewer and slower improvements in physical
fitness. Id. at 748-49. Thus, the behavioral confirmation effects were induced indirectly
through measures to prevent low expectations from kicking in, rather than by inducing
poor performance.
231. Oranit B. Davidson & Dov Eden, Remedial Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Two Field
Experiments to Prevent Golem Effects Among Disadvantaged Women, 85 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 386, 396 (2000).
232. Fiske, supra note 50, at 366; Madeline E. Heilman, Sex Stereotypes and Their
Effects in the Workplace: What We Know and What We Don’t Know, 10 J. SOC. BEHAV.
PERSONALITY 3, 10 (1995) (discussing contextual salience).
233. Williams & Segal, supra note 114, at 90-102 (discussing studies).
234. See Keith B. Maddox, Perspectives on Racial Phenotypicality Bias, 8 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 383, 388 (2004) (finding that Afrocentric hair makes race salient);
Tina R. Opie & Katherine W. Phillips, Hair Penalties: The Negative Influence of Afrocentric
Hair on Ratings of Black Women’s Dominance and Professionalism, 6 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL.
1, 5 (2015) (experimental study finding that employment candidates with Afrocentric hairstyles were rated as less professional and less likely to succeed in corporate America than
employment candidates with Eurocentric hairstyles). An interesting finding of the Opie
and Phillips study is that although all evaluators were critical of Afrocentric hairstyles,
black evaluators were even more critical than white evaluators. Id. at 10. The researchers
theorized that this “horizontal hostility” manifests because blacks, like whites, are pressured
by powerful decisionmakers to adhere to Eurocentric professional standards, and in-group
members may impose conformity demands on their peers as a form of self-protection. Id.
235. See Lazos, supra note 69 (reviewing studies). Lazos describes a few of these
studies as follows:
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contexts can also make category membership salient. For example,
studies show that a highly skewed sex or race composition in a work
group is likely to activate stereotypes.236 Similarly, studies show that
being a token—the only African American, gay person, one of only a
few women, etc.—is likely to activate bias.237
Professors Moore and Trahan tested students’ attitudes by asking students to
rate a syllabus for a proposed sociology of gender course to be taught by a hypothetical woman professor. The students were asked to project what they anticipated the course experience would be like. The majority predicted that the professor would be biased and more than likely would have a political agenda.
When the hypothetical teacher was a male professor, students did not believe
that he would have an ideological agenda. Another study found similar results
with a Racism and Sexism in American Society class when the instructor was
African American (as opposed to white). And a third study found this attitudinal bias when a hypothetical Latino professor was proposed to teach a course
called Race, Gender, and Inequality.
Id. at 182 (citations omitted).
236. See Galen V. Bodenhausen, C. Neil Macrae & Jennifer Garst, Stereotypes in
Thought and Deed: Social-Cognitive Origins of Intergroup Discrimination, in INTERGROUP
COGNITION AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR, supra note 221, at 317; Williams, supra note 129,
at 418-19 (discussing studies on stereotyping and tokenism).
237. The facts of a Supreme Court case, Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003),
vividly illustrate how tokenism may increase the salience of an employee’s minority status,
as well as the self-fulfilling prophesy phenomenon discussed above. Catharina Costa was
employed as a warehouse worker at Caesars Palace Hotel & Casino for almost a decade.
See Costa v. Desert Palace, 268 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 2001). Described by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals as a “trailblazer,” see Costa v. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d 838, 844 (9th
Cir. 2002), she was the only female employee in the entire warehouse. Desert Palace, 539
U.S. at 95. Costa was responsible, along with other members of her union bargaining unit,
for operating the forklifts and pallet jacks to retrieve food and beverage orders. Costa, 299
F.3d at 844. During her tenure, she was constantly written up for minor infractions that,
when committed by male employees, were overlooked or even rewarded. For example,
when she came in late for work—on one occasion, even just a minute—she received a written reprimand, but when male employees were late or missed work, their tardiness was
disregarded or they were given overtime to make up for lost wages. Id. at 845. Costa
was regularly assigned less overtime than males, because they “ha[d] . . . famil[y] to support.” Id. Caesars management singled her out for harsher discipline; for example, she was
frequently warned and even suspended for allegedly hazardous use of equipment and for
use of profanity, yet men engaged in this conduct “with impunity.” Id. Costa also suffered
from sex-based verbal and physical abuse. For example, a female supervisor referred to her
as a “bitch,” and a coworker called her a “fucking cunt.” Id. at 846. One male supervisor
followed her around the warehouse, subjecting her to intense scrutiny, described by three
witnesses as “intense ‘stalking.’ ” Id. at 845. The situation came to a head when a male
coworker trapped her in an elevator and shoved her into a wall. Id. at 846. Costa was fired
for fighting, given her disciplinary history, while her male coworker, who had a relatively
clean disciplinary record, was merely suspended for five days. Id.
According to the Ninth Circuit, “Costa’s work was characterized as ‘excellent’ and
‘good.’ As her supervisor explained: ‘We knew when she was out there the job would get
done.’ ” Id. at 844. Yet, social psychological research suggests this may be why she was
targeted. Women in traditionally male occupations may face hostility, because they are
viewed as inappropriately masculine. Researchers describe this as an “agency penalty.”
See, e.g., Alice H. Eagly & Steven J. Karau, Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice Toward
Female Leaders, 109 PSYCHOL. REV. 573, 585 (2002). Moreover, when women perform well
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D. Working Identity
Building on these frameworks, as well as sociologist Erving
Goffman’s influential work on the formation of identity through
social encounters in everyday life,238 critical legal scholars have
in traditionally male jobs, they do so at the cost of being seen as “competent but cold,” see
Amy J.C. Cuddy et al., The Dynamics of Warmth and Competence Judgments, and Their
Outcomes in Organizations, 31 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 73, 85-86 (2011), and they
may experience negative reactions in the form of social and economic sanctions, an effect
known as “stereotype backlash.” See Laurie A. Rudman & Julie E. Phelan, Backlash Effects
for Disconfirming Gender Stereotypes in Organizations, 28 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
61, 67 (2008). Furthermore, studies suggest that when women convey anger at work, they
are conferred lower status and salary than men who express anger and lower status and
salary than women who do not express anger. See Victoria L. Brescoll & Eric Luis
Uhlmann, Can Angry Women Get Ahead? Status Conferral, Gender, and Expressions of
Emotion in the Workplace, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 268, 273 (2008). Indeed, men who express
anger at work may benefit from a heightened status. Id.
Costa’s solo status as the only woman in an otherwise all-male unit likely triggered
and exacerbated these discriminatory processes by making her sex more salient and a cue
to judgment. This could partly explain why, for example, Costa’s tardiness and foul language would be noticed, but not male employees’. That Costa displayed some of the behaviors her male-coworkers expected of her also suggests behavioral confirmation. The record
showed that management and warehouse coworkers thought of and treated Costa as a
“bitch.” In response to the bullying and ostracization, Costa may have felt isolated and
unhappy and responded in kind by sometimes behaving in an ill-tempered manner. Moreover, losing one’s temper, fighting, and cursing were routine behaviors in the warehouse,
and witness testimony suggested that she “got along with most people” and had “few arguments.” Costa, 299 F.3d at 845. The studies discussed above suggest that these displays
of anger would have hurt Costa but would have been inconsequential or even respected
when men lost their tempers in the warehouse. Ultimately, Caesar’s Palace attributed
Costa’s termination to her inability to get along with others, and Costa conceded that she
was “not . . . a model employee,” litigating her claim under the mixed-motive theory of
proof. Id. at 846. Costa won at trial, and the judgment was ultimately affirmed on appeal.
The Supreme Court held that, contrary to the Caesars’ position, the usual civil litigation
standard of the preponderance of the evidence applies in mixed-motive cases, and therefore, it was not a reversible error for the trial court to give a mixed-motive jury instruction
even though Costa did not introduce direct evidence of discrimination. Desert Palace, 539
U.S. at 101. Still, when viewed through the lens of social psychological research on role
incongruity, stereotype backlash, salience, the agency and anger penalty, and behavioral
confirmation, the case should not have been conceptualized as a mixed-motive case in the
first instance. The pattern of sex-based discriminatory treatment was egregious. Caesars
condoned the discrimination by ignoring Costa’s complaints or even disciplining her for
complaining. Costa, 299 F.3d at 845-46. Costa’s reaction to this toxic environment, assuming there was some truth to Caesar’s assertions about Costa’s social skills, was consistent
with social psychological understandings of how individuals respond to discrimination.
Caesars’ asserted “legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons” for firing Costa—that she was
not a team player and had a long disciplinary record—are most accurately understood as
the product of discrimination, rather than a justification for it.
238. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE
(1959). Goffman (1922-1982) was a Canadian-American sociologist working within the
sociological field of symbolic interactionism, which looks at everyday behavior and
interactions between people to help explain society. Some examples of everyday interaction
would be meeting people in a grocery store, workers interacting on the job, or children
playing in a park. Within this field, Goffman introduced a vocabulary normally associated
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documented how exclusionary institutional cultures and stereotypes
may interact to produce specific negative effects for individuals
belonging to outsider groups. For example, Devon Carbado and Mitu
Gulati have developed the concept of “identity work” to describe the
compensatory behaviors that outsider groups may engage in to avoid
negative stereotypes in the workplace.239 According to this
perspective, institutional characteristics, such as the “up or out”
promotion tracks and “good citizen” cultures of law firms and law
school faculties, may interact with group-specific stereotypes so as to
influence the kinds of choices employees make in negotiating their
identity.240 For example, an Asian employee at risk of being
stereotyped as submissive, nonthreatening, and detail oriented—
good worker-bee qualities but not generally rainmaker/partner
qualities—may choose to do extra identity work such as going out
drinking with colleagues, attending workplace-related social events,
or participating on sports teams with others at work.241 A lesbian
employee, in fear of workplace harassment or discrimination, may
decide to remain in the closet at work.242 Alternatively, a member of a
minority group may engage in “comforting” behaviors aimed at
making insiders comfortable about an employee’s minority status,
such as denigrating members of her own minority group.243
with the world of theater based on his theory that “life itself is a dramatically enacted
thing.” Id. at 72. To this end, he developed a “dramaturgical approach” to understanding
human interaction, id. at xi, which asserts that a person’s identity is not a stable and
independent psychological entity, but rather, is shaped as the person interacts with others,
id. at 252-53. Goffman’s work suggests that humans are pragmatic actors who continually
adjust their performance in response to often unspoken and taken-for-granted subtleties
that shape social interaction. Moreover, according to Goffman, these performances tend to
become institutionalized as performances conducted in similar settings and by similar
actors give rise to “stereotyped expectations” that transcend the particular interaction and
setting. Id. at 27. Goffman’s theory is useful to researchers who study prejudice, bias,
stereotyping, and discrimination, because it provides an account of how the disadvantaged
position of disfavored minorities is produced and maintained in institutional domains such
as schools and workplaces.
239. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259,
1262 (2000). A fuller treatment of their theory can be found in ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING
RACE IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA. See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 43.
240. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 239, at 1273-76.
241. Id. at 1263-66.
242. Id. at 1277.
243. Id. at 1301-03. Along the same lines, Joan Williams describes the comforting behaviors or roles that women must often engage in so as not to threaten men. She explains:
“In everyday interaction, women are more commonly stereotyped at the level of
subtypes, as ‘housewives’ or ‘career women,’ ‘babes’ or ‘lesbians.’ ” In environments where women experience bias, particularly those where women are outnumbered, sometimes women can succeed only by stepping into one of various
roles reassuring to men, including the mother, a nurturing consoler who handles the emotion work of a group; the princess, who pairs with a male protector;
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Kenji Yoshino offers a similar concept in his theory of “covering,”
whereby a minority group is permitted to retain and articulate its
identity as long as it mutes the difference between itself and the
mainstream.244 Covering demands are at issue, for example, when an
employer hires gays, but not a lesbian who “flaunts” her
homosexuality by formalizing her relationship through marriage245 or
when African-American women are pressured to straighten their
hair.246
As these critiques highlight, “identity work” often comes with
costs and risks, including compromising one’s sense of self, the risk
that others will identify the performative element of an outsider’s
behavior as strategic and manipulative, and the risk of triggering yet
other negative stereotypes.247 Moreover, as legal scholar Gowri
Ramachandran has argued, when a person’s identity lies at the
intersection of more than one low-status category, conformity
demands may be especially acute and costly.248 For example, a black
the pet, “a group mascot who applauds male achievements and gains acceptance by being a cute little person”; or Ms. Efficiency, a glorified secretary
who organizes the group and keeps things on track.
See Williams, supra note 129, at 419-20 (footnotes omitted).
244. YOSHINO, supra note 43, passim.
245. Cf. id. at 93-101 (recounting the story of Robin Shahar, whose offer of employment
as a staff attorney in Georgia’s Attorney General Office was rescinded after she informed
the state on a routine personnel form of her plans to hold a commitment ceremony with her
partner, Francine Greenfield). Shahar lost a freedom of intimate association suit based on
these facts. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F. 3d 1097, 1110-11 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
246. See generally Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection
of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365; Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece:
Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079 (2010); Ashleigh
Shelby Rosette & Tracy L. Dumas, The Hair Dilemma: Conform to Mainstream Expectations or Emphasize Racial Identity, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 407, 415 (2007).
247. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 239, at 1280, 1291-92; see also YOSHINO, supra note
43, at 145-54 (discussing the double bind that women face, because they are pressured to
be masculine enough to be taken seriously while also feminine enough to be an “authentic”
woman, and nearly always failing to hit the perfect, sweet spot).
248. See Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as “Catch 22”: Why Identity Performance Demands are Neither Harmless nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299, 301 (2006). For
the purpose of this Article, I discuss Gulati and Carbado’s theory of “working identity,”
Yoshino’s “covering,” and Ramachandran’s idea of “intersectionality as catch-22” together,
because all three of these conceptualizations of the nature and costs of the performative
aspects of identity illustrate my larger argument about how discrimination may influence
employees’ behaviors and decisions. Ramachandran, however, carves out a somewhat more
narrow position than the others do; she argues that expanding discrimination law to prohibit all conformity demands on minorities runs the risk of essentializing groups around
the identity performance in question. Id. at 301. She explains, “[E]quating bias against a
typical form of identity performance for a group with bias against the group itself may
naturalize the identity performance in question, thereby naturalizing and essentializing
the ‘differences’ between the group and others, promoting prejudice and pigeonholing.” Id.
at 301. She also notes that some demands are rational and “normatively good.” Id. at 30708. Given these concerns, she would legally condemn only those conformity demands that
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gay man who adopts a masculine gender identity to avoid being
stereotyped as an effeminate gay man runs the risk of triggering the
racist stereotype that black men are threatening and dangerous.249
Let us say, on the other hand, he tries to avoid being perceived as one
of the “bad blacks” by dressing to a T in designer brands, practicing
meticulous grooming, and being especially friendly and polite with all
of his coworkers. This strategy runs the risk of being perceived as
weak and delicate, a “sissy.”250 There is no winning. As these writers
also highlight, Title VII reinforces the mandate to “work” one’s
identity, to cover, to assimilate into invisibility,251 by failing to protect
covered employees from discrimination on the basis of the behavioral
or cultural aspects of their identities.252
create a true “catch-22” for an individual, that is, demands that, because of the person’s
intersectional identity, are impossible to meet simultaneously. Id. at 303-04.
Ramachandran provides the classic example of Ann Hopkins, who was denied partnership at Price Waterhouse mainly because management felt she should “‘walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled,
and wear jewelry.” See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989). The Supreme Court held that this type of demand constituted illegal sex discrimination because of
the impossible position it imposed on Hopkins: “An employer who objects to aggressiveness
in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not.
Title VII lifts women out of this bind.” Id. at 251. Ramachandran is somewhat skeptical
that Hopkins could not have put on a little make up, put a lid on her potty mouth, and
ultimately made partner. Ramachandran, supra, at 317. She is hesitant to question Price
Waterhouse’s demand that its partners be aggressive, but she ultimately seems to view
Hopkins’ situation as a legally unjustifiable demand, or at least coming very close to one.
Id. at 319-22 (classifying Hopkins’ predicament of having to be both aggressive and not
aggressive as an “incoherent situation”); see also id. at 339 (noting that Hopkins’ very existence at Price Waterhouse was “something of an incongruity”). Ramachandran’s careful
analysis provides a helpful way to think through the complexities of conformity and the
tradeoffs of legal recognition, but the research discussed in this Article suggests that her
narrow definition of an illegal conformity demand as only one presenting a no-win, absurd
choice may be insufficiently sensitive to the structural dimensions of majoritarian norms
and their impacts on individuals.
249. Ramachandran, supra note 248, at 322.
250. Id. Moreover, even if this man were straight, this strategy could backfire to a
greater or lesser extent, as colleagues may perceive him as being an “uppity” black. Indeed,
there is a long history in the United States of punishing blacks who acted or dressed nicely.
In southern states, for example, African Americans were restricted to wearing dressy
clothes only in their neighborhoods or on Sundays. Black men were even physically attacked for dressing in ways that southern whites felt was above their station. After World
War I, sometimes African-American veterans literally had their uniforms cut off them. See
SHANE WHITE & GRAHAM WHITE, STYLIN’: AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPRESSIVE CULTURE FROM
ITS BEGINNINGS TO THE ZOOT SUIT 155 (1998).
251. See Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 965, 965-66 (1995) (describing “Latino invisibility” created by English-only rules and
other mechanisms of erasure).
252. See YOSHINO, supra note 43, at 24; Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 246, at 1086-87.
For other articles on performative aspects of identity and discrimination, see generally
Mari J. Matsuda, Voice of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence
for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE. L.J. 1329 (1991); Camille Gear Rich, Performing
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E. Bias Avoidance
In the work and family context, labor economist Robert Drago and
his colleagues developed a similar idea called “bias avoidance.”253
Bias avoidance occurs when employees respond to biases in the
workplace by engaging in avoidance strategies—behaviors designed
to escape potential career penalties associated with caregiving
commitments.254 These behaviors include strategically minimizing or
hiding family commitments.255 For example, employees may delay
partnering, marriage, or child rearing. If already a parent, the
employee may not take parental leave, not display family photos in
her workspace, or not ask for a flexible work arrangement.256
Unsurprisingly, Drago and his colleagues found that bias avoidance
behaviors are gendered; women more often than men engage in bias
avoidance behaviors, because the division of labor in the home is
uneven, and ideal worker and motherhood norms are applied more
heavily to women.257
F. Conclusion
This research illustrates how discriminatory bias and structural
aspects of the workplace can combine in insidious ways to negatively
impact employee energy and productivity, motivation, investments,
aspirations, and a whole host of factors widely viewed as individual
defects “external” to the workplace. All of this is to suggest what we
know intuitively to be true and is not controversial across a wide
range of fields that study social processes and organizations—that
humans are social beings who respond to their environments—and
when an environment is filled with prejudice, bias, and
Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1134 (2004); Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege in the Workplace: The Missing Element in Antidiscrimination Law, 4 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 171 (1996); Kimberly A. Yuracko,
Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination: An Argument About Assimilation, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 365 (2006).
253. See Robert Drago et al., The Avoidance of Bias Against Caregiving, 49 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 1222 passim (2006).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1223.
256. Id.; see also ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME
AND HOME BECOMES WORK 85-88 (1997) (discussing her decision not to display photos of
her children at work); WILLIAMS, supra note 115 (discussing men’s fear of using parental
leave and the hesitation by working-class men to inform managers the real reasons for
their absences from work (babysitting breakdowns), even in the face of discipline).
257. Drago et al., supra note 253, at 1223, 1240; cf. Scott A. Moss, Women Choosing
Diverse Workplaces: A Rational Preference with Disturbing Implications for both
Occupational Segregation and Economic Analysis of Law, 27 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 9-11
(2004) (discussing studies finding that women’s lower level of workforce participation and
avoidance of traditionally-male jobs is a rational response to the expectation of
discrimination).
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discrimination, individuals’ choices, behavior, and performance can
be negatively affected. The power of others’ beliefs over one’s
behavior is extremely strong.
The good news is that the processes that give rise to inequality
can be disrupted. In the next Part, I survey some of the experimental
research discussing voluntary measures that employers can take to
minimize the likelihood of bias and stereotyping and their negative
effects, as well as several strategic and doctrinal interventions that
would encourage employers to take affirmative steps to prevent and
halt the domino effect.
V. DISRUPTING THE DOMINO EFFECT
Having attempted to establish the concept of the domino effect in
the workplace, I now turn to a set of interventions that might disrupt
this discriminatory process. I discuss two potential interventions. In
Section V.A., I suggest voluntary measures that employers can adopt
to prevent and remedy the processes of discrimination documented in
this Article. These measures are evidence-based; they should be
effective if an employer is committed to preventing and remedying
discrimination. However, recognizing that this commitment is
oftentimes lacking without the threat of liability, in Section V.B., I
explore litigation strategies and revisions to some core doctrinal rules
in Title VII jurisprudence that would allow Title VII to more
effectively address the workplace domino effect.
A. Evidence-Based Voluntary Employer Measures
The domino effect is not inevitable. Crucial findings from the
fields of sociology and organizational behavior provide guidance on
voluntary measures that employers can take to disrupt the social
processes that produce inequality inside their workplaces. In
particular, social scientists have identified five personnel measures
that can serve as a counterweight to the domino effect by minimizing
the likelihood of stereotyping and its biasing effects: (1) constructing
heterogeneous work groups; (2) creating interdependence among ingroup and out-group members; (3) minimizing the salience of
minority status in personnel decisions; (4) replacing subjective data
with objective data; and (5) holding decisionmakers accountable for
nondiscrimination.258 Past research has also found positive effects of
egalitarian organizational norms at reducing bias. Each of these
measures is briefly explored, in turn.
258. See Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29
CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 323 (2000).
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Creating heterogeneous work groups with diverse membership
tends to “suppress ingroup preference and outgroup derogation,
stereotyping, and concomitant bias [in] personnel decisions.”259 This
will be especially effective if work is arranged so that employees
share “common goal[s] . . . [and] have institutional support for their
joint enterprise.”260 Interdependence among employees incentivizes
them to work cooperatively toward shared goals and to ascertain
accurate, individuating information about out-group members.261
Therefore, this type of work arrangement can diminish biases that
may lead to discrimination. For example, supervisors who know that
their salaries depend on the productivity or evaluations of their
subordinates are more likely to provide the support their
subordinates need to succeed and judge them more accurately.262
These measures are based on prominent social psychologist
Gordon Allport’s “contact hypothesis,” which posits that intergroup
contact reduces intergroup conflict and increases intergroup harmony
under certain conditions.263 According to Allport, for intergroup
contact to be beneficial, there must be equal status among majority
and minority groups who share a common goal within a context of
institutionalized support.264 Allport’s contact hypothesis has proven
to be quite durable, despite criticisms by some social scientists as
being naïve about the dynamics of group power. It has been validated
in a large number of empirical studies since its proposal,265 including
in laboratory experiments and real work settings.266
259. Id. at 324.
260. Id. at 324.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 324-25.
263. See GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 264-67, 281 (1954).
264. See id.
265. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 23-24 (2000) (citing studies) (“The hypothesis has been tested, and has
usually been confirmed, in a large number of empirical studies using many different methodologies—field studies, survey research, and laboratory experiments—in a wide range of
settings.”).
266. Id. at 23-26. Indeed, insights about the contact hypothesis first emerged from one
of the largest employers in the United States, the U.S. military. As explained by
sociologists Frank Dobbin and Alexandra Kalev:
Evidence that contact between groups can lessen bias first came to light in an
unplanned experiment on the European front during World War II. The U.S.
army was still segregated, and only whites served in combat roles. High
casualties left General Dwight Eisenhower understaffed, and he asked for
black volunteers for combat duty. When Harvard sociologist Samuel Stouffer,
on leave at the War Department, surveyed troops on their racial attitudes, he
found that whites whose companies had been joined by black platoons showed
dramatically lower racial animus and greater willingness to work alongside
blacks than those whose companies remained segregated. Stouffer concluded
that whites fighting alongside blacks came to see them as soldiers like
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A second voluntary measure that employers can undertake to
protect against the activation of stereotypes is to minimize the
salience of minority status dimensions in personnel decisions.
Salience is “[a]nything that focuses [the] observers’ attention on a
stereotyped category” and thereby “ ‘primes’ stereotyping.”267 Thus,
for example, “[a] highly skewed sex or race composition in a work
group is likely to activate stereotypes.”268 This research suggests that
a diversified workforce should diminish stereotyping by diminishing
the salience of any particular group’s identity.
A third and well-established intervention that has been shown to
minimize race and sex bias is replacing subjective data with objective
data by developing formalized evaluation systems that rely upon objective measures. This means employers should use “objective, reliable, and timely information that is directly relevant to job performance” when making personnel decisions.269 This may be easier said
than done, however.
Substantial research suggests that objective measures, alone, may
not minimize bias in personnel decisions, because individuals do not
consistently apply objective measures to in-group and out-group
members.270 Two recent studies illustrate this phenomenon. In 2009,
Joan Williams and Veta Richardson surveyed 694 law firm partners
to get a handle on the impact of law firm compensation systems on
women.271 “A flood of comments stressed that law firm compensation
is subjective even when objective factors are considered.”272 Female
partners surveyed as part of the study made comments such as,
“some factors are ‘important’ if they justify paying a man, especially a
themselves first and foremost. The key, for Stouffer, was that whites and
blacks had to be working toward a common goal as equals . . . .
Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Why Diversity Programs Fail: And What Works Better,
HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 2016, https://hbr.org/2016/07/why-diversity-programs-fail
[https://perma.cc/26HY-A9VE].
267. Reskin, supra note 258, at 325.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See Michael I. Norton et al., Mixed Motives and Racial Bias: The Impact of Legitimate and Illegitimate Criteria on Decision Making, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 36, 42-44
(2006) (finding that decisionmakers easily find reasonable, merit-based justifications for
selecting whichever job candidate they choose); Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen,
Constructed Criteria: Redefining Merit to Justify Discrimination, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 474,
475-76 (2005) (finding that when two job candidates were considered for the position of
police chief, respondents preferred the male candidate when he had more experience than
the female candidate, citing the importance of experience, but still preferred the male candidate when he had more education and less experience than the female candidate, citing
the importance of education).
271. See generally Joan C. Williams & Veta Richardson, New Millennium, Same Glass Ceiling? The Impact of Law Firm Compensation Systems on Women, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (2011).
272. Id. at 648.
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man with a family, . . . and other factors are ‘important’ if they will
justify paying a woman, especially a single woman, less” and “[a]gain,
[it] depends on who is being compensated, especially with respect to
whom management favors. A factor that means nothing as [to] one
partner can be the reason to compensate another partner, if someone
on management wants to protect/cover that person.”273 In another
study, Northwestern’s Kellogg School of Management Professor
Laura Rivera spent a year conducting fieldwork in the recruiting department of an elite professional service firm. As part of her research, she sat in on group deliberations where candidates were discussed and ultimately selected.274 She found that the team paid little
attention when white men blew a math test, chalking up their poor
performance to an “off day,” but paid close attention when women
and blacks performed poorly on the same test.275
Given the persistence of bias and discrimination even in evaluation systems employing objective measures, augmenting objective
evaluation measures with effective accountability is crucial.276 Accountability is defined as ‘‘being answerable to audiences for performing up to certain prescribed standards, thereby fulfilling obligations,
273. Id. at 649-50 (first and fourth alteration in original).
274. LAUREN A. RIVERA, PEDIGREE: HOW ELITE STUDENTS GET ELITE JOBS 2 (2015).
275. Id. at 229. Courts are also not immune from this tendency. For example, in the
Warner case, discussed supra notes 133-74, the district court honed in on the fact that the
man who was promoted rather than Warner had more years of experience than Warner,
even though Warner and the successful candidate scored only a few points apart on a merit-based rating system, see Warner v. Vance-Cooks, 956 F. Supp. 2d 129, 153 (D.D.C. 2013),
and years of experience was not a listed element in selection system, see Motion for Summary Judgment, Warner, 956 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D.D.C 2013) (No. 1:10-cv-01306), ECF No.
21-8, at 2-4.
276. See Reskin, supra note 258, at 325. As sociologist William Bielby explained in his
expert report in the recent Wal-Mart litigation challenging the company’s subjective and
bias ridden promotion practices:
A written equal employment opportunity (“EEO”) policy that is simply reactive
and lacks effective accountability is vulnerable to bias against women and minorities. Often, such a system constitutes what social scientists call symbolic
compliance: an exercise in “going through the motions,” with little substantive
impact on creating a work environment that is free of bias.
Declaration of William T. Bielby, Ph.D. in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification at ¶ 50, Dukes et al. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. C-01-2252 (N.D. Cal. 20042003),
2003 WL 24571701. Bielby was relying in large part on Lauren Edelman and her colleagues’ early work on employers’ responses to civil rights laws, which found that paper
policies oftentimes represent symbolic compliance, with little substantive impact on eliminating bias. See Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531 (1992); Lauren B. Edelman et al.,
Legal Ambiguity and the Politics of Compliance: Affirmative Action Officers’ Dilemma, 13
L. & POL’Y 73 (1991); Lauren. B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 L. & SOC. REV. 497 (1993); Lauren B. Edelman et al., Symbols and Substance in Organizational Response to Civil Rights Law, 17
RESEARCH IN SOCIAL STRATIFICATION & MOBILITY 107 (1999).
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duties, expectations, and other charges.’’277 When decisionmakers
know that they will be held accountable for the criteria they use to
make decisions, the effect of bias on decisions is reduced and decisions are made with more accuracy.278
Research in many contexts consistently shows the positive impact
of accountability on reducing bias and increasing diversity. For example, in a recent laboratory study, college-student participants
viewed a fictional videotaped interview with an applicant for a university department head position.279 Participants who received information indicating that the applicant was gay rated him less positively, but the discrimination disappeared when participants were told
that they would have to justify their ratings.280 That is, in the “accountability condition,” no differences in ratings were seen between
the gay and non-gay applicant.281 Along the same lines, studies also
show that individuals who think their actions are being judged by
others demonstrate lower levels of bias.282 MIT School of Management Professor Emilio Castilla’s recent field study of performancebased reward decisions concerning almost 9,000 employees in a large
private company nicely illustrates this point. Castilla found that the
firm consistently gave African Americans with identical job titles and
performance ratings as whites, smaller raises, but when the firm
posted each unit’s average performance rating and pay raise by race
and gender, the gap in raises all but disappeared.283
The critical role of accountability in controlling bias brings us to a
set of second questions posed by social scientists who study organizational inequality: What practices or policies create meaningful accountability? Here we have some helpful research. True accountability has three features: systemic monitoring of inequality, holding
managers accountable for achieving equal opportunity goals, and
277. Barry R. Schlenker et al., The Triangle Model of Responsibility, 101 PSYCHOL.
REV. 632, 634 (1994).
278. See Reskin, supra note 258, at 325; Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: The Neglected
Social Context of Judgment and Choice, 7 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 297, 310 (1985).
279. Joel T. Nadler et al., Aversive Discrimination in Employment Interviews: Reducing
Effects of Sexual Orientation Bias with Accountability, 1 PSYCHOL. SEXUAL ORIENTATION &
GENDER DIVERSITY 480, 483 (2014).
280. Id. at 485.
281. Id.
282. See Selmi, supra note 42, at 217 (reviewing studies showing that “[w]hen individuals know their actions will be reviewed, they are far less likely to allow their discriminatory impulses to influence their actions.”); see also Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 266, at 5860 (discussing several studies illustrating the principle that people “need to look good in
the eyes of those around us.”).
283. See Emilio J. Castilla, Accounting for the Gap: A Firm Study Manipulating Organizational Accountability and Transparency in Pay Decisions, 26 ORGANIZATIONAL SCI. 311,
323 (2015). This study and others like it provide strong support for Gowri Ramachandran’s
pay transparency proposal. See Ramachandran, supra note 66.
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monitoring and analysis of employees’ perceptions of discriminatory
barriers and career opportunities.284 Consistent with these findings,
and based on their study of 829 mid-sized and large firms, sociologists Frank Dobbin and Alexandra Kalev identify transparency, diversity taskforces, and the appointment of diversity managers as examples
of three specific measures that successfully create accountability.285
In sum, the persistence of bias frustrates the potential benefits of
incorporating objective recruitment and performance standards into
the workplace, but it does not doom them. There is a broad consensus
that with the added ingredient of accountability, objective evaluation
is a very effective tool for eliminating discriminatory bias.286
Finally, past research has found positive effects of organizational
norms at reducing bias in personnel decisions.287 How to change
corporate culture is a complex subject, but research shows that
“[e]mployers’ organizational choices can both facilitate and constrain
the development of discriminatory work cultures.”288
Of course, in order for voluntary accountability measures to be
adopted, there must be a normative commitment to equality, which
simply does not exist in many workplaces at an organic, voluntary
level. The next Part, therefore, explores litigation strategies and legal
reforms that would encourage or require employers to undertake
measures that are likely to disrupt the organizational processes that
produce inequality.
284. See Declaration of William T. Bielby, supra note 276, at ¶ 50.
285. Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 266, at 58-60.
286. A dramatic example of how accountability can disrupt bias is the finding that
checklists in the medical setting can save women’s lives. When a critical care physician and
his team at Johns Hopkins Hospital, for example, developed a protocol requiring that every
physician use a checklist requiring doctors to review the need for every patient to receive
special blood clot prevention measures upon admission to the hospital, it discovered systemic gender bias. See Jessica Nordell, A Fix for Gender Bias in Healthcare? Check, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/opinion/a-fix-for-gender-biasin-health-care-check.html. Women trauma patients, apparently, were at significantly
greater danger of dying of preventable blood clots than men, because doctors were less
likely to provide them with blood clot prevention treatment. Id. After introduction of the
checklist protocol, the gender disparity completely disappeared. Id. The intervention was
based on surgeon, writer, and public health researcher Atul Gawande’s revolutionary book
on the use of checklists in in the business world and medical profession. See ATUL
GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT (2009). Gawande’s
research shows how something as simple as a checklist ensures that best practices are
followed; they work by reducing errors and creating accountability in complex or stressful
situations. Id.
287. Frank Dobbin, Suhann Kim & Alexandra Kalev, You Can’t Always Get What You
Need: Organizational Determinants of Diversity Programs, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 386, 395
(2011); see also Lauren A. Rivera, Diversity Within Reach: Recruitment Versus Hiring in
Elite Firms, 639 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 71, 87 (2012) (study of hiring in elite law
firms, investment banks, and management consulting firms finding that “widespread cultural
beliefs among decision-makers that university prestige is an essential signal of merit but that
diversity is an invalid one” inhibits the effectiveness of diversity recruitment programs).
288. See Green, Work Culture, supra note 42, at 650.
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B. Incorporating the Domino Effect into Disparate Treatment
Law and Practice
Having attempted to establish the concept of the domino effect in
the workplace, and how it might be halted through voluntary
measures by employers, I now turn to its implications for Title VII. I
touch on a few concrete areas of disparate treatment law and
practice, rather than evaluate all of the theory’s implications for
employment discrimination law, which I will defer to future
scholarship. I begin with suggested innovative uses of existing
doctrine and culminate with broader reform proposals that can more
fundamentally update disparate treatment law to incorporate the
insights of the domino effect.
1. Causation
The critical issue in any disparate treatment case is causation,
that is, whether an adverse employment action was because of discrimination or a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Assuming the
claim is decided on the merits, the plaintiff’s qualifications for a position or work performance are more often than not the central issue
that is determinative of causation, and ultimately, the outcome of the
claim. The emphasis holds true whether the action proceeds under
Title VII’s burden shifting evidentiary framework for proving intentional disparate treatment established by McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green289 or the mixed-motive alternative first established in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.290 Typically, the employer will assert that the
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action is that the plaintiff’s qualifications or work performance were
weaker than another applicant or employee’s. As the Warner case
discussed in Part III illustrates, courts often take such evidence at
face value, dismissing disparate treatment claims on summary judgment. However, the domino effect, and all of the social science research establishing its existence discussed in this Article, demonstrate that employees’ qualifications and work performance can be
seriously diminished by discriminatory employment actions and work
arrangements.
Therefore, in litigating disparate treatment claims, plaintiffs’ advocates must build a narrative explaining the domino effect and its
ultimate impact on employees, spelling out the common chain reaction that occurs when various types of discriminatory exclusion, even
289. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
290. 490 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1989); see also Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g) (2012); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93-94 (2003).
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if seemingly insignificant in isolation, combine and interact, are internalized by employees, and ultimately cause significant, material
inequalities. The domino effect is a chronic discriminatory pattern,
yet we have no comprehensive legal theory to prevent it, much less a
name for it. By employing the domino effect as the theory of the case,
advocates can help judges and juries understand how this systemic
behavior can lead to a point at which an employee appears less qualified or underperforming relative to non-protected employees.291
If plaintiffs’ attorneys do their job in this way, courts may be better able to see how the discrimination alleged by the plaintiff compromised the plaintiff’s qualifications or work performance, and,
more broadly, how discrimination shapes employees’ behaviors and
preferences. Under this approach, evidence of an employee’s qualification or work performance would still be important in deciding
whether discrimination occurred, but it would be interpreted more
carefully. Especially where a protected employee can show that she
had equal or greater qualifications and experience as her peers when
hired, and, over time, without obvious reasons, lost significant
ground compared to unprotected employees, courts should recognize
that a domino-like process of discrimination may be at play. Of
course, not all responsibility for inequality of workers protected by
Title VII can be laid at the feet of employers. At the same time, the
substantial research establishing the domino effect suggests that this
pattern of inequality deserves deeper judicial scrutiny. Employers
should not be permitted to hide behind the very discrimination Title
VII is intended to eradicate.
Because this approach to causation in disparate treatment actions
is consistent with long-established summary judgment principles, it
would not require any major doctrinal or legislative revisions. In an
employment discrimination action, as in all civil actions, on a motion
for summary judgment, if there is a genuine issue of material fact,
the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.292 Crediting plaintiffs’ assertions about their
qualifications and job performance enough to find the plaintiff has
created an issue of fact, and evaluating this evidence absent the
taint of employers’ alleged discrimination, is consistent with these
established evidentiary and procedural principles. Even in circuits
that employ a form of evidentiary exceptionalism by adopting looser
291. A useful model for developing such a narrative can be found in Joan Williams’s
and Stephanie Bornstein’s scholarship and successful advocacy establishing the doctrine of
Family Responsibilities (“FReD”) discrimination. See Williams & Bornstein, supra note 60.
292. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)); cf.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (noting the Court
must review the record “taken as a whole”).
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summary judgment standards for employment discrimination
claims,293 it is not inconsistent for courts to assess whether the
alleged “nondiscriminatory reason” for an adverse employment
action is a symptom of illegal disparate treatment.294
Of course, as an evidentiary matter, the assertion that a person
would be better qualified or performed better except for the employer’s discrimination may be difficult to determine. Because the domino
effect involves dynamics that might evade direct measurement,
courts may be hesitant to see the connection between an employer’s
allegedly discriminatory actions and an employee’s qualifications or
performance. Yet, the difficulty of such determinations is exactly the
reason these questions are best left for juries. Judges must avoid the
temptation to engage in fact finding when they are skeptical about a
case. In turn, plaintiffs’ attorneys can help judges by educating them
about the domino effect and by telling a compelling causal story.
2. Adverse Employment Actions
The workplace domino effect also has significant implications for
the definition of an adverse employment action under Title VII. Title
VII prohibits not only discrimination in hiring and firing; it makes it
unlawful to discriminate against an employee with respect to
“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” or to
“limit, segregate, or classify . . . employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee.”295 Courts have interpreted this language
to require that plaintiffs demonstrate an adverse employment action,
generally defined as some material effect on the terms and conditions

293. See Theresa M. Beiner, The Trouble with Torgerson: The Latest Effort to Summarily Adjudicate Employment Discrimination Cases, 14 NEV. L.J. 673, 689-94 (2014) (identifying the Third, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits as those that have adopted a defendant-sympathetic version of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases); Lee
Reeves, Pragmatism over Politics: Recent Trends in Lower Court Employment Discrimination Jurisprudence, 73 MO. L. REV. 481, 551-56, 552 n.246 (2008) (identifying the Seventh
Circuit, among others, that adopt a “relaxed summary judgment” standard in employment
discrimination cases).
294. Many legal scholars have written on the misuse of summary judgment and other
procedural mechanisms in employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont
& Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to
Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 104 (2009); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of
Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 705706 (2007); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61
LA. L. REV. 555, 561-69 (2001).
295. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
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of employment.296 Ultimate employment actions—hiring and firing—
suffice; however, when it comes to less direct economic effects on
employees’ lives, courts have been inconsistent.297 Moreover, as the
Warner case discussed in Section III.B. illustrates, even in cases that
involve ultimate employment decisions, such as the denial of a
promotion, federal courts routinely regard ongoing patterns of
discrimination as a series of minor, isolated incidents and thereby
place a great deal of employment discrimination beyond Title VII’s
reach. However, as this Article demonstrates, small, seemingly
isolated incidents of discrimination often add up to significant
changes in an employee’s economic status. Therefore, a tangible
adverse employment action under Title VII must be understood to
encompass the cumulative and total effect of a series of
discriminatory actions or circumstances that, together, result in a
substantial change in an employee’s economic status or working
conditions.298
This more expansive definition of an adverse employment action
would align disparate treatment doctrine with sexual harassment
doctrine, which recognizes that a series of discriminatory acts can
rise to the level of illegal discrimination if sufficiently severe or
pervasive.299 In determining whether an actionable hostile work
environment claim exists, courts look to all the circumstances.300
There is no intellectually coherent justification for distinguishing
between disparate treatment and harassment in this regard. Like
harassment, disparate treatment is oftentimes perpetuated through
repeated, smaller actions, with the same cumulative harmful effects.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that sexual harassment is
simply a variant of illegal sex discrimination; there is no requirement
that the harassment occur because of sexual desire.301 Nor is there
any requirement that the plaintiff have a nervous breakdown to
296. See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 65 (2013).
297. See Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121 (1998).
298. I am not suggesting that actions such as moving an employee’s office, imposing a
burdensome work schedule, giving a mediocre performance evaluation, or failing to provide
a training opportunity that supports an employee’s advancement, should always, in isolation, rise to the level of a materially adverse employment action, even if perpetrated because of an employee’s protected group membership. In addition to docket pressures, enabling lawsuits over trivial matters risks undermining the legitimacy of employment discrimination complaints. However, these sorts of discriminatory actions, especially if frequent, typically result in tangible harm to a protected employee in the form of unequal pay
or job status. The harms caused by the domino effect should, therefore, in many instances,
easily meet Title VII’s definition of an adverse employment action.
299. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 23 (1993).
300. Id.
301. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
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prevail in a harassment claim.302 The harassment must simply be
unwelcome, objectively and subjectively hostile, and sufficiently
severe or pervasive to interfere with an employee’s work
performance.303 Given this expansive definition of unlawful
harassment, it is hard to discern any fundamental difference between
harassment and disparate treatment that would justify allowing
aggregate evidence of discrimination to rise to the level of a tangible
employment action for one claim but not the other, or for that matter,
to disallow such aggregation for any type of disparate treatment
claim.
Some may contend that a more expansive definition of an adverse
employment action for disparate treatment claims would effectively
transform Title VII into a general anti-bullying mandate. But Title
VII does not prohibit all exclusionary behavior in the workplace; it is
directed only at discrimination against protected classes of
employees. In establishing an adverse employment action, the
plaintiff would still be required to prove that the actions considered
were because of or motivated by race, color, national origin, age, sex,
or religion.
3. Aggregate Disparate Treatment Claims
Taking this analysis a step further, if it is correct that disparate
treatment and hostile work environment claims are not
fundamentally different, then plaintiffs should be permitted to
aggregate evidence of both forms of discriminatory exclusion to prove
disparate treatment. For example, in the hypothetical discussed in
Part II of this Article, the pharmacology professor would be
permitted to aggregate her evidence of sexual harassment with her
evidence of sex-based disparate treatment to prove a violation of Title
VII.304 This reasoning should apply to race or other types of
discrimination as well. For example, given the broad remedial
purposes of Title VII, there is no rational reason that an AfricanAmerican plaintiff should not be permitted to aggregate evidence
demonstrating race-based disparate treatment with evidence of a
racially-tinged hostile work environment to support his disparate
treatment claim. Aggregation might also be especially useful for
employees who concurrently experience gender and sexuality based
302. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
303. Id. at 21-23.
304. Vicki Schultz proposed something similar many years ago. She argued that courts
should consider all of the conduct challenged by the plaintiff, both sexual and nonsexual, in
considering sexual harassment claims. See Schultz, supra note 76, at 1798.
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discrimination, since both forms of discriminatory exclusion are
inextricably intertwined305 and often include a component of
harassment.
The possibility of aggregating sexual harassment and disparate
treatment evidence to support a disparate treatment claim raises
many complexities and questions.306 I will leave these for exploration
in future work, but the larger point is that the artificial wall between
disparate treatment and harassment obscures larger patterns of
discriminatory conduct. It is worth considering whether this wall
should be torn down.307
More broadly, the workplace domino effect can serve as a
conceptual umbrella that invites reconsideration of a whole range of
disparate treatment doctrines that disaggregate evidence to the point
of incoherence, thereby obscuring the central role of employers in
creating inequality. I call these “disaggregation doctrines.” They
include, among others, the stray remarks doctrine,308 the “cat’s paw”
doctrine,309 the expansive employer defense for sexual harassment,310

305. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Comm. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 351-52 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(holding that sexual orientation is inherently a sex-based consideration, given that it is a
concept that cannot be understood without reference to the sex of an employee).
306. For example, should the employer defense for hostile work environment sexual
harassment be available when the plaintiff combines disparate treatment and hostile work
environment sexual harassment evidence to support a disparate treatment claim? A preliminary analysis suggests that it should not, at least where there is evidence that the
domino effect culminates in an ultimate adverse employment action. The safe harbor provision was established in the sexual harassment context to address the situation where an
employee suffers harassment because of her sex but no ultimate adverse employment action; it has no place where a domino-like process of discriminatory exclusion culminates in
substantial change in an employees’ status or working conditions because of her protected
group membership. A second question is whether a plaintiff should be permitted to aggregate evidence of discrimination based on more than one protected category, so as to fashion
a hybrid, intersectional claim. For the seminal articulation of why such intersectional,
hybrid claims must be available, see Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection
of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139. Combining sexual harassment and
disparate treatment evidence may also raise complex limitations and damages issues.
307. Other scholars’ thinking is moving in this direction as well. See, e.g., Sandra S.
Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69 passim (2015) (discussing
the unhelpfulness of rigid conceptual frameworks that courts have developed, because they
undermine the broader purposes of Title VII and squeeze out valid claims, and proposing to
abandon most of Title VII’s existing frameworks in favor of a simplified, statute-based approach to analyzing employment discrimination cases); see also Eisha Jain, Note, Realizing
the Potential of the Joint Harassment/Retaliation Claim, 117 YALE L.J. 120, 156-64 (2007)
(proposing combined sexual harassment and retaliation claims).
308. See Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment Doctrine
in Employment Discrimination Law, 77 MO. L. REV. 149, 174-89 (2012).
309. See Stephen F. Befort & Alison L. Olig, Within Grasp of the Cat’s Paw: Delineating
the Scope of Subordinate Bias Liability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Statutes, 60
S.C. L. REV. 383 (2008).
310. See discussion supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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the “lack of interest” defense,311 and the rule in some circuits that
statistical evidence is generally not probative of disparate treatment.312
Social science research demonstrating the domino effect suggests that
these disaggregation doctrines unduly restrict the evidence that courts
may consider in deciding disparate treatment claims. They are ripe for
revision (or elimination) and will be fruitful topics for future analysis
in light of this Article’s foundational contributions.
Even if adopted, the litigation strategies and targeted doctrinal
interventions explored thus far may not be sufficiently
transformative, and so next I consider a more fundamental
reconceptualization of Title VII’s basic proof structure.
4. The Disparate Treatment Proof Structure
Any workplace that evidences severe patterns of discrimination,
such as sex or racially segregated workforces or stark glass ceiling
patterns, strongly suggests that discrimination is occurring inside
that workplace. When these patterns are evident, Title VII should
prohibit judges, as a matter of law, from attributing stark patterns of
inequality to supply side factors such as individual employee
characteristics, choices, or qualifications.
With this principle in mind, disparate treatment law could be
reformed so as to create tiers of potential liability depending on the
severity of inequality in a particular workplace. Thus, for example,
courts or Congress could create a rebuttable presumption that an
adverse employment action was “because of” the protected
characteristic within the meaning of Title VII when the plaintiff
works in a job setting that is significantly unequal. The presumption
would not apply in workplaces demonstrating a high degree of
integration and equality, thereby creating an incentive for employers
to be proactive in addressing the dynamic nature of discrimination.
Richard Ford has proposed a version of this in his concept of a
positive “duty of care” to purge employment decisions of the influence
of bigotry, which, if demonstrated by an employer in litigation, would
create a safe-harbor from liability for employment discrimination.313
Under Ford’s approach, “the law might evolve to require employers to
use the best practices currently developed in management science to
avoid discriminatory decisions. Doing so would give the employer a
311. See Schultz, supra note 73; Schultz & Petterson, supra note 185.
312. See Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004); Van Slyke
v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 17 F. App’x 154 (4th Cir. 2001); Bullington v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1319 (10th Cir. 1999) (overruled on other grounds).
313. Richard Thompson Ford, Bias in the Air: Rethinking Employment Discrimination
Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1381, 1403-15 (2014).
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safe harbor from liability; failing to do so would give rise to a strong
presumption that challenged decisions were discriminatory.”314 I
would go one step further. To avoid symbolic compliance,315 and to
encourage employers to adopt effective measures, the existence of
employer nondiscrimination policies without corresponding results
should not suffice to eliminate the strong presumption of
discrimination.
Imposing legal standards that create presumptions of
discrimination may be a scary prospect to some readers, but the risk
of false positives could be reduced by limiting the application of the
presumption to situations where the workplace reflects stark
patterns of inequality or the employer has a record of repeated past
violations. Such an approach would also incentivize employers to
take positive measures to ensure their workplaces are free of
discrimination.
5. Positive Duties
Finally, we might take a cue from countries that have demonstrated
an earnest commitment to eliminating employment discrimination
through implementation of proactive models to achieve worker
equality. Such approaches involve the imposition of positive duties on
employers “to eliminate discrimination of all types and to foster
equality in the workplace.”316 The key feature of the positive duties
approach is that it is not adversarial or fault-based. Rather, it
requires employers to “formulate equality goals, to monitor their
workplaces for inequality, and to alter practices and patterns of

314. Id. at 1419. Ford is just one of several employment discrimination scholars who
have proposed that employer liability under Title VII should rest on negligence principles.
See, e.g., David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899
(1993); cf. Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation,
and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357 passim (2009)
(presenting an analysis suggesting that negligence principles should guide disparate
treatment liability where there is (1) individual workplace harm caused by membership in
a protected class; and (2) employer responsibility for the harm, which includes, but would
not be limited to, having notice of the harm and negligently failing to prevent it).
315. Sociological research shows widespread judicial deference to employers when they
adopt institutionalized employment structures to address discrimination; judges infer nondiscrimination from these structures without scrutinizing them in any meaningful way.
For example, in a large-scale study, Lauren Edelman found that judges are increasingly
willing to equate unenforced nondiscrimination policies, “decoupled” EEO offices that lack
authority, ineffective diversity trainings, and unpublicized, ineffective, or rarely used
grievance procedures (due to fears of retaliation) with legal compliance, even in the face of
compelling evidence of discrimination. See LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS,
CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC CIVIL RIGHTS passim (2016).
316. KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION
FOR THE CHANGING WORKFORCE 192 (2004).
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conduct that stand in the way of achieving their equality goals.”317
For example, employers would be required to conduct periodic
reviews of employment practices, including recruitment, training,
and promotion, for the purposes of determining whether women,
racial minorities, and people with disabilities, for example, are
enjoying fair participation in employment.318
The aim of the positive duties approach is to shift the focus away
from individual victims and to focus instead on institution- and
society- level practices and structures that produce inequality. Many
countries have adopted this approach in recognition that “there
remain deep-seated structural disadvantages which blight the lives
of many women, Black and Asian people, and disabled persons,”319 as
evidenced by “institutionalised racism in the police”320 and similar
barriers in public services and private organizations. These
observations are poignantly applicable to the situation of many
groups in the United States.
Although at odds with our historical approach to regulating
employment discrimination, the positive duties approach may
provide a useful model for updating Title VII to reflect the domino
effect and other contemporary forms of employment discrimination.
At minimum, the positive duties model can inform doctrinal
innovations that shift the responsibility for substantial workplace
inequality to employers, where it belongs.
VI. CONCLUSION
Title VII has labored too long under the weight of black and white
thinking. A significant body of sociological research on how
discrimination operates on the ground, inside workplaces, every day
is now available to guide courts and policymakers. This research
demonstrates that worker inequality often results from a series of
317. Id. This approach was summarized in an influential 2000 report, Equality: A New
Framework, Report of the Independent Review of the Enforcement of UK AntiDiscrimination Legislation. In preparing the report, the authors surveyed employers in
Britain, Northern Ireland, and the United States and heard from many individuals and
organizations who have either experienced the effects of discrimination or attempted to
counter it.
318. STONE, supra note 316, at 71-72. Although still reliant on litigation, Margo
Schlanger and Pauline Kim suggest something similar in their call for a greater regulatory
role for the EEOC in the implementation of routinized and managerialist responses to employment discrimination. See Margo Schlanger & Pauline Kim, The Equal Opportunity
Commission and Structural Reform of the American Workplace, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1519,
1526 (2014). They argue that injunctions obtained by the EEOC in systemic cases have had
the positive effect of encouraging employers to internalize and institutionalize norms and
practices that facilitate equal employment opportunities. Id. at 1582.
319. See STONE, supra note 316, at 71-72.
320. Id.
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discriminatory acts or conditions that combine and interact in ways
that, over time, lead to large differences in employee status and pay
due to their cumulative and mutually reinforcing nature.
Unfortunately, the unwillingness to think rigorously about how
discrimination occurs has had serious negative consequences.
Stubborn patterns of discrimination exist across every industry and
workplace setting in America. This situation will not change without
a fundamental reconceptualization of Title VII so it may account for
the domino effect and other contemporary forms of discriminatory
exclusion.

